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The Love Letter as Law
Peter Goodrich*
I am Arnaut, who hoards the wind
And hunts the hare with an ox.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In a striking biographical depiction of her contemporaries, first
published in 1659 under the title Divers portraits, Madame de
Montpensier describes a "kind of Republic" of learned women within
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Costas Douzinas, Desmond Manderson, Hilary Schor, Kaja Silverman, Marty Slaughter, and
Chris Stone for some remarkable suggestions, for brave words of encouragement, and for soft
words of doubt. I owe a particular debt to Chuck Yablon for an exceptional commentary that
he wrote me on Valentine's Day, 1996. I hope that the text is in some small measure a reply that
does justice to that commentary. My thanks finally to Linda Mills for a correspondence, our
epistolarity, which originally opened up the possibility of this Article.
1. THE POETRY OF ARNAUT DANIEL 43 (James J. Wilhelm ed. & trans., Garland 1981).
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the French monarchical state.2 That Republic of erudite or illustrious
women, known collectively as les prdcieuses, constitutes one of the last
flowerings of the literary tradition of women's courts and the jurisdic-
tion of love.3 The prdcieuses can be depicted best as a short-lived
radical movement of separatist women who endeavoured to found and
govern an oppositional feminine public sphere within the patristic
autarchy of the civil society of their time. Most dramatically, they
reconstituted the tradition of courts and judgments of love, both the
legislation and the casuistry of amorous relationship, as determinants
of the rules of a feminine public sphere. Administered by women,
judged by ethical norms and enforced in aesthetic and poetic as well
as political terms, the laws of this feminine public space took the form
of a literary and specifically epistolary justice. The love letter was the
trope of writ or law in the courts of love and it was in the form of
letters, through correspondence, that the prcieuses would map the
most profound domain of human relations or interactions, that of the
heart or of the carte de tendre.a
The response both of their contemporaries and of more recent legal
history to the oppositional laws and courts of love, to this jurisdiction
of dissent, has been dismissive.' The prdcieuses and their litany of
radical challenges both to the form and to the substance of the
masculine polity posed too great a threat to the social norm to be
valued by their contemporaries or transmitted by legal historicism as
part of the tradition of law. The feminine Republic of letters, the
casuistic norms and the amorous missives of the courts of love were
not delivered or, more optimistically, have yet to arrive. The notion
2. MADAME DE MONTPENSIER, DIVERS PORTRAITS 301 (Caen, n.p. 1659) ("Ce seroit quasi
une sorte de Republique, si ces personnes n'estoient pas ndes dans un Etat Monarchique."). For
a contrasting view, see ABBt D'AUBIGNAC, HISTOIRE DU TEMPS 26-29 (Paris, Sercy 1654). For
an analysis of the politics and geography of amour prdcieux, see JEAN-MICHEL PELOUS, AMOUR
PRICIEUX. AMOUR GALANT (1654-1675) 13-34 (1980).
3. On the earlier tradition, see Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas
Capellanus and the Judgments of Love, 48 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1996).
4. On the carte de tendre or "map of the heart," see 1 MADELEINE DE SCUDtRY, CLtLLE,
HISTOIRE ROMAINE 399 (Paris, Augustin Courb6 1660) (1654) (currently available edition). For
contemporary commentary, see JOAN DEJEAN, TENDER GEOGRAPHIES: WOMEN AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE NOVEL IN FRANCE 55-57 (1991) (arguing that the carte de tendre or "map of
the heart," the fictive geography of amorous relationships, was simultaneously located in the
domain of literature and in that of the actual interaction of the sexes); PELOUS, supra note 2,
at 13-26.
5. With respect to the earlier tradition, see, for example, JACQUES LAFITTE-HOUSSAT,
TROUBADOURS ET COURS D'AMOUR (5th ed. 1979) (arguing that the courts of love existed only
for social diversion or amusement); Paul Remy, Les 'cours d'amour': ldgende et realitd, 7 REVUE
D'UNIVERSITI DE BRUXELLES 179 (1955) (arguing that the courts of love had, at best, a literary
and loosely didactic existence). In terms of theoretical dismissal, see JACQUES LACAN, Courtly
Love As Anamorphosis, in THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: THE ETHICS OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 1959-1960, at 146-49 (1992) (describing the tradition of courtly love as a
fantasm, comparable to the hallucination that emerges from a syringe); see also SLAVOJ ZIZEK,
THE METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT 108 (1994).
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of women taking over a portion of public space was dramatically
dismissed as ridiculous by the pr~cieuses' contemporaries and as
amusing diversion or dangerous fantasy by later historians.6 The
reasons for such denial or repression are relatively obvious: The
courts were administered by women, their law was explicitly op-
positional, their norms aesthetic, their substantive doctrine developed
out of literary pretention, and their politics utopian or revolutionary.
Furthermore, the object of their regulation, the affectivity of
relationship and of amorous exchange, belonged to a patriarchally
governed private sphere. It was and still is deemed laughable to treat
the imaginary domain of love or the intensivity of relation as a subject
of law, or as a dimension of political space.7 In consequence, the
notion of a feminine public sphere which would adjudicate and
facilitate the space of relationships, the space in between lovers and
friends, women and men, must remain part of a negative history of
law, a history of repressed jurisdictions, failed doctrines, or minor
jurisprudences. For this reason I will recapitulate briefly the positive
context or the reality of the pr~ieuses and of their laws.
The prdcieuses were a political movement based around the work
of a group of prominent female intellectuals, authors, and letter
writers in mid-seventeenth century France. The movement can be
dated fairly specifically by reference to Madeleine de Scud6ry's Les
femmes illustres of 1642, which reinvoked the classical figure of
Sappho, and argued in emancipatory terms for a "justice and truth"
proper to women.' Although the demands of the pr~cieuses were
couched in literary terms, it is worth emphasizing that their initial
context was that of armed rebellion and the exceptional role played
by women in the French civil war, the Fronde, the armed uprisings
6. See MOLItRE, LES PRtCIEUSES RIDICULES (Denis Canal ed., Larousse 1990) (1659)
(exemplifying this tendency). As regards modem dismissal of such a movement, Pelous has
remarked: "[E]very attempt to justify the idea that the prcieuses existed in reality results in in-
coherence and insoluble questions." PELOUS, supra note 2, at 376; see also id. at 44-50, 359-78.
Ian Maclean has expressed a similar view: "[T]hese ideas are indeed revolutionary, but they lack
reference to everyday life ... [or] mundane reality." IAN MACLEAN, WOMAN TRIUMPHANT:
FEMINISM IN FRENCH LITERATURE 1610-1652, at 115 (1977); see also id. at 115-17, 152-54.
Domna Stanton has argued that preciositg was a fiction of male fantasms. See Domna Stanton,
The Fiction of Prdciosit6 and the Fear of Women, 62 YALE FRENCH STUD. 107, 109-11 (1981).
Rend Bray offers the appropriate corrective: "[Iun defining prdciositg history should keep its
modest place as the servant of critique...." RENt BRAY, LA PRP-CIOSITt ET LES PRtCIEUX DE
THIBAUT DE CHAMPAGNE A JEAN GIRAUDOUX 8 (1948).
7. See, e.g., CHARLES SOREL, LES LOIX DE LA GALANTERIE 15-17, passim (Paris, Sercy
1659) (satirizing the precieuses by setting out an inverse set of laws of male galantry); see also
CHARLES SOREL, LA DESCRIPTION DE L'ISLE DE PORTRAITURE ET DE LA VILLE DES PORTRAITS
57-59 (Paris, Sercy 1659) (discussing the narcissism of the pr~cieuses). For a recent, jejune yet
amusing example, see Gretchen Rubin & Jamie Heller, Restatement of Love: Tentative Draft,
104 YALE L.J. 707 (1994).
8. MADELEINE DE SCUDIRY, LES FEMMES ILLUSTRES 155 (Cot6-femmes 1991) (1642). On
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against the influence of Anne of Austria's prime minister Cardinal
Mazarin of the late 1640s. 9 The role played by women as political and
literary leaders, as generals, agitators, and pamphleteers in the Fronde
has been well documented, and gave rise to the popular seventeenth
century figure of the female Amazon.1" The role of the pr~cieuses in
the Fronde has another significance. It dramatically demonstrated the
potential power, the political importance and threat of the feminine
in the masculine polity or extant public sphere. The boundaries of the
gynaeceum and of a femininity exiled by Salic law to the domain of
domesticity, exploded in the public domain." It also indicated the
reality, the political commitment and the absolute seriousness of the
social movement, of the salon, more specifically of the ruelle, and of
the judgments of love that the prdcieuses embodied and disseminated.
Whatever the threat posed by the direct military engagements of
the prcieuses, there is an indisputable political radicalism both to the
involvements and the demands of the movement. They sought justice
and they conceived it to require a radical legislation of new forms of
public space, of institution, of relationship, and of language. The
preferred means of achieving these goals was that of a separate
jurisdiction, an imaginary space or domain, of women's law within a
distinct public sphere. 2 Developed out of the salon and the ruelle,
the new courts of love took their place within a feminine public space
and within a context of literary rules and judgments concerned with
new forms of relationship, of lifestyle, and of love. In doctrinal terms,
9. For a contemporary account of the origin of La Fronde, see MADAME DE MONTPENSIER,
LA FRONDE. LE COMBAT DU FAUBOURG SAINT ANTOINE 263-65 (Paris, Henri Gautier 1896)
(1652) (work only existed in manuscript form until publication in 1896). Madame de
Montpensier describes the coining of the term, early in the course of the troubles, when a
parliamentary counselor embarked upon an attack on Cardinal Mazarin with the words "je le
fronderai bien" [I will attack him thoroughly]. Id. at 263.
10. For a brief but interesting interpretation of the Fronde, see DEJEAN, supra note 4, at
33-43; see also NINA RATTNER GELBART, FEMINISM AND OPPOSITION JOURNALISM IN OLD
REGIME FRANCE (1987) (arguing that La Fronde was a formative part of the tradition of
feminist oppositional journalism and political dissent, and linking feminism to other political
causes). A similar genealogy is suggested briefly in DENA GOODMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF
LETTERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT 112, 158-59 (1994).
11. On the scholastic distinction between the gynaeceun or women's realm and the public
sphere, see JEAN BODIN, DE REPUBLICA 746-53 (London, Knollers 1660) (1576) (first English
edition) (depicting the law of masculine succession of the monarchy, and reiterating the Roman
law exclusion of women from political and judicial office, and from possession of property);
ANTOINE HOTMAN, TRArr DE LA LOY SALIQUE 267-69 (Paris, Mathieu Guilleme 1611)
(describing and justifying the exclusion of women from all forms of succession and office in
terms of antique custom, unwritten law, antiquity of greatest weight and authority, "the most
ancient memory ... et sunt haec arcana imperii" [and these are the mysteries of government]).
12. See 10 MADELEINE DE SCUDtRY, ARTAMENE OU LE GRAND CYRUS 573-80 (Paris,
Augustin Courbt 1656), which depicts the loix d'amour as applicable in the first instance to the
subjects of the rebel principality of Sauromates. In this aspect de Scudery borrows from the 15th
century tradition in which the courts of love had separate jurisdictions for distinct amorous
activies and for different moods.
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the blank space or utopian project of the carte de tendre or op-
positional political domain of affectivity, what I have called the
jurisdiction of dissent, was governed by what would now be termed
a feministic ethic.
13
The model of relationship was that of love between women, and its
basis was to be stylistic and aesthetic as well as ethical and political.
At a most general doctrinal level, the prcieuses were women of
letters who valued an aesthetic of social exchange, of conversation,
and of correspondence. They sought "subtlety of thought, method in
desire, and purety in style."14 Such attributes of "nobility of
spirit,"' 5 of a feminine "bel esprit, ' ' 6 were to be achieved through
the cultivation of preciosit9, of the value and valuation of the
feminine, through a "state of the soul ... a collective spirit, a
technique, an ethics, and a certain form of social life."' 7 The
predominant practical forms of such a social life or, in Montpensier's
term, of this kind of Republic, were in essence those of a feminine
domain within the public sphere, a domain which included, in a minor
key, a legislature and courts which would adjudicate all questions of
lifestyle, of relationship, of affectivity, and of love."
The means which the pr~cieuses chose to achieve their goals and
particularly the abolitionist and separatist terms of many of their
demands have frequently and inappropriately distracted attention
from the substantive goals of the movement. Most specifically, they
sought the abolition of the institution of marriage and its replacement
by a douce libertg in matters of amorous inclination or of choice of
lovers.19 If there was to be a law of relationship it was, in Scudrry's
terms, to be contractual, an alliance d'amour, and not a permanent or
proprietary conveyance. In the words of one pr~cieuse, which interes-
tingly foreshadow the language used by contemporary feminist theory,
one should at the very least be married to someone-se marier d
13. See ERICA HARTH, CARTESIAN WOMEN: VERSIONS AND SUBVERSIONS OF RATIONAL
DISCOURSE IN THE OLD REGIME 34-54 (1992).
14. 1 MICHEL ABBt DE LA PURE, LA PRItCIOSITI OU LE MYSTkRE DES RUELLES 192-93
(Paris, Guillaume de Luyne 1656).
15. The prdcieuse in this respect belongs within a long tradition of "illustrious" or erudite
women and is defined by Antoine Baudeau de Somaize in the dual terms of a woman of spirit
and a woman who writes: The precieuse has two sorts of nobility, "a noble spirit by heredity and
a noble spirit by letters." 1 ANTOINE BAUDEAU DE SOMAIZE, LE GRAND DICTIONNAIRE DES
PRtTIEUSES 47 (Paris, Jean Ribov 1661).
16. On the definition and differentia of bel esprit, see FRANCOIS CALLIPRES, DU BEL ESPRIT
00 SONT EXAMINEZ LES SENTIMENS OU'ON EN A D'ORDINAIRE DANS LE MONDE 98-100 (Paris,
Anison 1645) (distinguishing bel esprit, the faculty of imagination and of beautiful thoughts, from
bon esprit, which is similar to reason and good sense).
17. BRAY, supra note 6, at 15.
18. For an introduction to the ethics and casuistry of the pr&ieuses, see DEJEAN, supra note
4, at 17-42, 85-93; PELOUS, supra note 2, at 67-70, 307-25.
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quelqu'un-and not be married, as she stated was then the case,
against someone-se marier contre quelqu'un.2' Attendant upon the
contractual scheme of voluntary and volitional affection, the respon-
sibility for child rearing was passed from women to men. Such a novel
arrangement would allow for the revaluation of exclusively feminine
company and conversation, and would change the nature of public
discourse and social exchange. At one juncture, the pr6cieuses
proposed a corresponding revision of the French language which
would banish all words of the masculine gender.21 The latter project,
that of purification of the French language and the institution of
aesthetic criteria of discourse, was not as absurd as satirists or
predominantly male opponents have sometimes suggested. The
pr~cieuses proposed, in essence, a literary model of relationship
aligned to the development of an art of amorous interaction. The
notion that affective or private discourse, the language and the
practice of love, could be judged by women was peculiarly
threatening. It was predicated upon the revolutionary idea that the
actual practice, the reality of the relation between the sexes, could be
subject to scrutiny and to judgment. It was predicated upon the idea
of a justice of relationship and countenanced the notion that women
could desire differently from men. The precieuses in this sense
advocated a revaluation of discourse, and a corresponding revaluation
of the word as written by, or as the writing of, the feminine.
The value to which prciosit9 refers is in form a linguistic one. The
epistolary novel of the pr~cieuses and their literary development of a
new era of the salon and of courts of love shared a common and
constant theme. It was that of placing the domain of affectivity upon
the political map. To make relations of love objects of judgment
required that they belong to a public sphere or demi-monde of the
social. The metaphor of law and the judgments of the courts of love
were the method which was used to achieve this end. The love letter
specifically acts as the transgressive emblem of the possibilities of the
new forms of sapphic relationship and of love. In de Scud6ry's view,
if the feminine was to have a social value other than that of property
and servile sexual use, it could only be through the legislation of an
objective space of relationship, a public sphere or Republic of
affective exchange, in which space-or territory-specified values,
those of pr~ciosit9, would demarcate the domain and freedom of
20. See 2 DE LA PURE, supra note 14, at 216; see also LUCE IRIGARAY, JAIME A TOI.
EoUISSE D'UNE FItLICITI DANS L'HISTOIRE 223-35 (1992).
21. See 2 DE SOMAIZE, supra note 15, at 10-11. See generally ROGER LATHUILLPERE, LA
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amorous relations. 2 Love as a relationship was to be understood as
an intrinsically platonic enterprise and only secondarily as sensuality:
"I understand that to be loved ardently is to be loved exclusively and
with respect ... and that [such love must] be based upon the solidity
of friendship and founded upon esteem and upon inclination. I further
demand that a lover be faithful and sincere."' In pursuing the value
of the feminine, and the subjective space of a love entre deux, or
between separate and different subjectivities, de Scud6ry and the
preieuses who followed her placed an inordinate value upon the
literary and upon letter writing as the proper expression of the space
of relationship and as the appropriate form of love.24 It was the love
letter-the billet doux, the amorous poem, verse, and
declaration-that could best institute and express the space in
between lovers. The love letter articulated the necessary space of
relationship, the distance through which both intimacy and affection
were made possible.
The feminine Republic of the precieuses was a species of outlaw
public sphere. It was also explicitly an imaginary domain, an impossi-
ble politics, a utopian assertion of a women's law within the context
of a constitution governed by an antique Salic law which denied
women all political and legal rights. 25 The Republic of the pr~cieuses
was free to adopt any law. Its oppositional character allowed it to
legislate any jurisprudence it pleased, to develop whatever case law
or ethical casuistry it wished. As an experimental and loosely heretical
movement, the precieuses were free to rewrite the law and to choose
whatever mechanism or doctrine best suited their political enterprise.
They chose the love letter. The love letter established the public space
of amorous relationship, the space between lovers, that of intimacy
and of affectivity, with which the Republic of the pr6cieuses and their
carte de tendre were concerned. The epistolary art was the means used
to institute and express a separate jurisdiction appropriate to
relationships, a justice and judgment that attended to the space
between lovers. The love letter was in that sense the legislation and
the writ of an alternative or oppositional public sphere. In the
language of the period, the love letter was the law of the first Venus,
22. See 10 DE SCUDtRY, supra note 12, at 607-13.
23. Id. at 342-45. See BRAY, supra note 6, at 154-55, for a discussion of the relevant
passages.
24. See 1 DE SCUDtRY, supra note 4, at 259-397; see also DEJEAN, supra note 4, at 78-79;
HONOR_ D'URFI, LES EPISTRES MORALES ET AMOUREUSES 493-548 (Paris, Gilles Robinet
1619).
25. The Salic law precluded women from inheriting or owning property in France. See
HOTMAN, supra note 11, at 267-69. For the most important constitutional expression of this view,
see BODIN, supra note 11, at 646-54. For discussion of this source, see PETER GOODRICH,
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it was both statute and writ of a feminine domain. In its strongest
formulation, the law of the first Venus and its manifest form, the love
letter, was a higher order of rule, a law of conscience and of the spirit,
a governance of the soul.26 The love letter was not only another and
competing model of law within its own domain or sphere, it also
represented and inscribed an order of decision and of judgment, a
case law. The love letter was the means used to articulate the
decisions and casuistic rules that were to mark and regulate the space
of relationships and of disputes between lovers. To the extent that a
culture views questions of life style, of affective relationship and love
as important, the rules of love and the justice of correspondence will
be matters of concern within the public sphere. The pr&ieuses did no
more in that sense than formulate explicitly the casuistic tradition of
love in the form of amorous writ and epistolary justice.
The love letter was the trope of law within the courts of love. It is
this feature of the history of the pr~cieuses, of their courts and their
judgments in cases of love, that I wish to pursue in this Article. In
Part II, I argue in broad trans-historical terms that it is no accident
that the prcieuses adopted the love letter as the form of law in the
Republic of women. There is a remarkable correspondence between
the love letter and the legal writ, or positive law. They are both
developments of the same rhetorical art, that of the ars dictaminis,
and they share a parallel history and express comparable substantive
rules. It will be my argument that the love letter precedes and dictates
the form of modem law. The love letter governs the domain of
relationships and of affective life. It expresses and institutes what was
termed the law of the first Venus, of which positive law and secular
writ were a divergent and secondary strand. 7 The laws of the second
Venus, the laws of men, were municipal and local, they were the pale
shadow or vague reflection of a higher and repressed jurisdiction. 8
In Part III, I argue that the love letter and positive law share a
specific substantive or doctrinal project. They are both concerned with
addressing the intensities, the emergence, the transitions, and the
breakdowns of relationships and other forms of human exchange. In
this sense the love letter is its own law, it belongs to a separate and
superior jurisdiction, and it sets out an aesthetic, a style, and an ethic
of social relations of which love is an extreme but exemplary form.
26. See JOHN SELDEN, JANI ANGLORUM FACIES ALTERA 11 (London, T. Bassett 1683)
(1610) (first edition unavailable). The law of the first Venus is that of nature, of the divinity, and
of the spirit, while that of the second Venus, secular law, is the shadow of nature, and refers to
the merely municipal rule of positive law. See id.
27. See, e.g., 3 JEAN DONNEAU DE Vist, L'AMoUR tCHAPt OU LES DIVERSES MANIkRES
D'AYMER 332-431 (Paris, Thomas Jolly 1669).
28. See D'URFt, supra note 24, at 544-48.
8
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The love letter is thus both more than law and in breach of law. It is
an intimacy made public, a fantasm on the borders of which reality is
constructed, a justice that determines the fate of positive law. If
positive law is principally a mechanism for the governance of human
relationships, the understanding or the truth of such relationships is
first mapped and defined by the epistolary rules of love. In short, the
carte de tendre or map of the heart precedes and defines the more
distant, indirect, and indeterminate rules of the public sphere of
positive law. If positive law is capable of attending to the missives or
laws of the first Venus, it can both develop an understanding of the
affective dimensions of lawyering and begin to appreciate the plurality
of domains and of forms both of justice and of law.
In Part IV of the Article my argument will be a more tenuous one.
It is my thesis that the love letter and law share a comparable yet
distinct concern with authenticity and truth. More specifically, the love
letter as law can teach us a considerable amount about the justice of
relationship and the space of affective exchange. By this I mean that
the love letter institutes the domain or space in which relationships of
love can occur in the same way that historically the writ instigated the
space of a legal form of exchange. The love letter instituted cor-
respondence, or more technically epistolarity, as the form of justice.
Positive law borrowed that model but rapidly repressed its sources
and forgot its rules as it also grew to ignore or annex the plurality of
jurisdictions of which the love letter, and the feminine public sphere,
were symptoms. The law of love was in a Freudian sense destined to
become "the other scene," the unconscious or repressed domain of
positive or secular law. The domain of affective relationships was to
become a "private sphere," a hidden jurisdiction, governed by
unconscious or unseen laws. The love letter can here act as a species
of therapy for lawyers. Psychoanalysis has for some time recognised
the insistence of the letter in the unconscious. This refers in a general
sense to the linguistic structure of the unconscious and more
specifically to the priority of the signifier over the subject. It refers to
the law-the insistence-of the letter as the determination of
unconscious causes.29 Legal analysis could do well to recognise that
the insistence of the letter in the unconscious of law is the insistence
of the love letter.
29. See JACQUES LACAN, L'instance de la lettre dans l'inconscient, in ECRrrS 136 (1966)
(arguing the priority of the letter in the unconscious of the subject); see also Jacques Lacan,
Seminar on The Purloined Letter, 48 YALE FRENCH STUD. 39 (1972) (analyzing the narrative
of The Purloined Letter as an instance of the priority of the signifier-the insistence of the let-
ter-over the intentions of the subject); cf JACQUES DERRIDA, Le facteur de la vdritg, in THE
POST CARD: FROM SOCRATES TO FREUD AND BEYOND (Alan Bass trans., 1987) (discusssing
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Purloined Letters: The Case of Celie
To trace the history of what the institution has denied, negated,
repressed, or simply relegated to the gynaeceum or feminine sphere"
inevitably involves an historical methodology that relies both upon the
vestiges of the past and the imaginative reading of what his-
toriography has failed to relay. The records reflect the preferences
and privileges, as well as the emotional or imaginative limitations, of
those whom history was written to serve. The present reconstruction
of "another power" or "imaginary space ',31 addresses seriously a
documentary tradition that would otherwise be termed merely
literary, purely aesthetic, a feminine divagation rather than evidence
of any genuine institutional positivity. It is also for this reason that it
is necessary to adopt a somewhat syncretic approach to the textual
evidence of the epistolary domain and jurisdiction of courts of love.
Much of the extant evidence or express depictions of cases and
judgments are reported somewhat after the era of the prdcieuses and
often in texts written with satirical or hostile intent by masculine
novelists. Rather than simply discount such literature, it seems
preferable to read it symptomatically, that is to say, as a negative
expression of an institutional history that has yet to be fully recovered
in more positive forms.
It is in this vein that I will address my first example, the history of
Celie. The case is reported in a late seventeenth-century compilation
of cases of love, authored by Jean Donneau de Vis6 with clear fin de
siecle satirical intent. It is nonetheless an exemplary story of love
letters and law, of justice and its epistolary forms, and can thus serve
well as an introduction to the principal arguments to be made in this
Article. In short, Celie is a prdcieuse even if the report makes little of
that context, being written somewhat later by a male author. There
is scant factual detail to the narrative; it is simply reported as a
casuistical question of the law of love, and its determination is noted
without comment or extensive judgment.
The occasion of the report is literary. Celie, described by the
historian narrator as "the best and most spiritual person in the world"
30. The reference to the gynaeceum is to the glossators' reception of the traditional Roman
law concept of a womens' sphere, a private familial sphere outside of politics, law, and
proprietary right. See ANDREAS ALCIATUS, DE VERBORUM SIGNIFICATIONE 204, 229
(Luguduni, Gyphius 1536) (providing the classic glossatorial definition of gynaeceum). However,
the gynaeceum was the space of tutelage of virtue, and it was there the duty of women to
inculcate ethics. See [SIMPHORIEN CHAMPIER], LA NEF DES DAMES: VERTUESES COMPOStE PAR
MAISTRE SIMPHORIEN CHAMPIER 55-66 (Paris, n.p. 1515).
31. The expression is taken from PIERRE LE MOYNE, LA GALLERIE DES FEMMES FORTES
13 (Paris, Cockart 1663).
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has been seen in tears in the suburbs of Paris, "towards Vincen-
nes.'32 To this it should be added that she was observed "at the hour
when the legal profession left work and went to dine."33 The
occasion and time of the report is thus literary in that it is defined at
the margins of law. Its subject is doubly marginal in that it concerns
a woman who is also a spiritual person, a prcieuse, and it is
recounted at the time when the profession goes to eat, when the law
has ceased to sit or is no longer in term. On another boundary or
limit of law it can be noted also and proleptically that the subject of
the case is both in motion and in tears, visibly affected by law and by
a peculiar epistolary fate. The hour of the report is dusk and this
finally suggests, as does femininity itself (which law has defined
classically by reference to the furies and to night) a border, a space
of possibility and portent, of transgression and truth, of fiction and
law.
Celie is not simply a spiritual woman. She is also a learned, erudite,
or strong woman, an author of letters, a practitioner of that branch of
the ars dictaminis, the legal art of writing, which was classically
termed ars epistolandi et amandi, the art of writing and loving.34
Celie was a specialist in classical authors and the Latin language. She
was reputed both to speak and write exquisite Latin. Her case begins
with an exchange of letters with an admirer, Thersandre. Thersandre,
a man, a potential lover, a competitor and immoralist, a galant, was
a fellow Latinist who prided himself upon his skill in the classical
tongue. Upon hearing of her reputation, he sought out Celie's
company so as to measure her competence in Latin. Upon acquain-
tance his conclusion was that she spoke it as well as he did. It
remained only to discover if she could write Latin, if her pen was as
powerful as her tongue. To this end, Thersandre sent Celie a number
of billet doux, love letters, in Latin. She responded in the most elegant
of styles and, in time, Thersandre fell imperceptibly in love with Celie.
Thersandre declared his love for Celie "in so spiritual a Latin that she
could not help but be impressed by it."35 Over time, and with the
passage of correspondence, Celie began to reciprocate Thesandre's
32. 1 JEAN DONNEAU DE Vist, LES NOUVELLES GALANTES, COMIQUES ET TRAGIQUES 62-
63 (Paris, Estienne Loyson 1680).
33. Id. at 62.
34. See generally BERNARD BRAY, L'ART DE LA LET'RE AMOUREUSE. DES MANUELS AUX
ROMANS (1967) (discussing the history of the early modem tradition of letter writing). The most
influential works were probably ESTIENNE Du TRONCHET, LETTRES AMOUREUSES (Lyon, Paul
Frellon 1595) (1569) (first edition available in British Library) and JAN PUGET DE LA SERRE,
LE SECRETAIRE A LA MODE (Amsterdam, Elzevier 1644) (1632) (first edition available in British
Library).
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love, she found him "almost as lovable as his Latin,"36 and began to
admire his person as well as his letters.
The love affair began as a philological encounter. It began as an
exchange of letters in Latin, and so is immediately also a question of
law, of translation and interpretation, of tradition and its truth. More
specifically, written reason or ratio scripta, the spirit and the language
of Latinity, established a space of text and of writing, of history and
of civility in which both love and law were joined through a common
dependence upon the inheritance of the archaic language of Rome.
For the moment I will simply observe that the epistolary discourse of
desire preceded and engendered its corporeal equivalent, lust; the
opening of one envelope led to the opening of another, a serial
invagination. Writing, in other words, here preceded speech, and
letters came in advance of the real or the flesh. A series of letters, in
Latin, a philological and amatory correspondence or exchange,
preceded and prescripted the love affair. Such is an inversion of the
norms of amorous exchange. Within the code of courtly love and the
rules of letter writing which it inherited from Ovid, the love letter
signals either the abandonment or the absence of the lover and the
consequent impossibilities of frustrated passion or amour lointain.37
Here, however, the classical references and humanistic pretentions of
the exchange perform a more modern function: the epistle anticipates
the real, the fiction prefigures the truth. The letter of the law is the
law of the letter.
The law and the letter raise further questions of transmission and
of fidelity, of the faith or belief upon which all law, public and
private, political and domestic, is founded.38 The latter question
arose in the case of Celie by way of other letters, and arose in a
complex form. Celie's husband, Celian, who was at that time residing
at another house in the country outside Paris, received an unsigned
36. Id. at 64.
37. On the laws of courtly love, see ANDREAS CAPELLANUS, TRACIATUS DE AMORE ET
DE AMORIS REMEDIO 310-12 (Havaniae, Gadiana 1892) (1176) (definitive revised edition). See
also my discussion of that work in PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE:
LITERATURE AND OTHER MINOR JURISPRUDENCES 29-71 (1996). On the broader tradition of
love letters, see generally PEGGY KAMUF, FICTIONS OF FEMININE DESIRE: DISCLOSURES OF
HELOISE (1982) (tracing the survival of Heloise and of her correspondence in the epistolary
genre of the novel in the 17th and 18th centuries); LINDA KAUFFMAN, DISCOURSES OF DESIRE:
GENDER, GENRE, AND EPISTOLARY FICTIONS (1986) (tracing the reception and sometime
reversal of the Ovidian tradition of the Heroides in feminine inscriptions of epistolary desire
from Heloise to The Three Marias).
38. For a classic statement of this dependence of law upon faith, see SIR THOMAS SMITH,
DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 111 (London, Middleton 1565):
[N]o man holds land simply free in England but he or she who holds the Crown of
England: all others hold their land in fee ... or feoda which is as much to say in fide or
fiducia, that is upon faith or trust, that he shall be true to the Lord of whom he holds it.
12
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol9/iss2/1
Goodrich
letter warning him that his wife was in love with one of his friends.
He returned to Paris to investigate the matter. Celie had in the
meantime herself been warned that one of Thersandre's relatives had
wanted to put an end to their love and had written to her husband.
Celie had therefore agreed with her "faithful lover" that they should
not see each other so often but that they would continue to cor-
respond and that she would keep his letters hidden. 9 Celie's
husband, believing that if his wife was in love, there would be letters,
searched for them. He eventually found one letter that Celie had
received that day and had forgotten to hide. The letter, however, was
in Latin, and not being conversant with the language, he could make
nothing of it. Celian said nothing to Celie and was meanwhile faced
with the delicate problem of how to have the letter translated without
publicizing his wife's possible infidelity or otherwise embarrassing
himself by exposing a circumstance which he would prefer to keep
secret. He then remembered that one of his best friends, Thersandre,
was a Latinist and so resolved to take the letter to him and, after
swearing him to secrecy, have him explain its contents.
Thersandre agreed to Celian's demand. Both friend and lover,
confidant and translator, author and interpreter, Thersandre is
described as being "extremely surprised when [shown] a letter which
he himself had written to Celie."4° He conceals his astonishment and
after reading a few words he says that he does not need to read it, he
has seen the letter before, it is the text of a polemical lecture
delivered by the ambassador of Poland attacking certain policies of
the King of France. The husband is delighted by this news and drops
the subject. Thersandre meanwhile writes a brief note in Latin to
Celie warning her of what has happened and preparing her for
possible discussion of the Polish ambassador's speech. He gives this
note to a servant to deliver and then talks with the husband until the
servant returns. The purloined letter is then returned by Celian to its
addressee and what could plausibly and literally be described as the
betrayal of translation is complete.
The next moment of the story is hermeneutic in the most classical
of senses: it involves the theft, translation, and recirculation of
messages. Celie ceases to love Thersandre and has an affair with a
young man, Cleobulle. Here the desire was immediate, she loved him
at first sight, but that love was again expressed in Latin and they
began to write to each other on a daily basis. The husband suspects
the existence of a love affair between Celie and Cleobulle and
39. 1 DE VIst, supra note 32, at 65.
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confides this suspicion to Thersandre, who is himself jealous of Celie's
apparent transfer of her affections. Thersandre has no doubt that their
correspondence is a sign of love and therefore advises Celian to have
a key made to the box in which Celie keeps her letters. Celian has a
key made and takes out a single letter. The letter is again in Latin
and so the husband brings it to Thersandre to translate. Thersandre
reads the letter and learns of Cleobulle's love for Celie. Wanting to
revenge himself upon Celie but not yet ready to reveal all to the
husband, he tells Celian that Cleobulle is deeply in love with Celie,
but adds that Celie has not yet reciprocated that love. Thersandre
subsequently visits Celie and in a heated exchange lets slip that he has
read one of Cleobulle's love letters. Celie thus learns of her husband's
access to, and theft of, her secret correspondence.
The last phase of the story is postal and involves a further
disruption in the relay of messages and the deferral of the arrival of
letters at their destination. Upon learning of her husband's theft of
her secret papers Celie empties her box of all correspondence and
puts in its place a single letter in her own hand addressed to
Thersandre. In this letter she berates Thersandre, castigating his
recent behaviour, his betrayal of their love and his collusion with her
husband. She also threatens that if Thersandre does not desist in his
ruses she will reveal everything to her husband. Celian takes the letter
to Thersandre to translate. Thersandre changes colour while reading
the letter and, despite the husband's presence, mutters several times
that Celie is evil and treacherous. Not knowing what to say about the
content of the letter, Thersandre, out of spite and a desire for
revenge, eventually tells the husband that the letter is from Celie to
Cleobulle and that it acknowledges and reciprocates the love that he
has shown her. Thersandre adds that his physical expression of
emotion upon reading the letter, his blushes and stammers, are the
result of the outrage he feels for the wrong done to his friend. The
husband returns and confronts Celie in a rage. She eventually forces
him to admit that his anger results from his theft of the letter and she
demands that he tell her what he thinks it contains. The husband
repeats Thersandre's misdescription of the contents of the letter and
Celie responds by demanding that the husband take the letter to be
translated by a third party, which the husband does. "[A]n old pedant
at the University"'" translates the letter. Celie is vindicated and the
husband severs all bonds with Thersandre.
For the sake of completeness I will note that the question posed as
a case of love is whether Thersandre or Celie had been in breach of
41. Id. at 73.
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faith, of their original alliance or contract of love. At first instance,
Thersandre was vindicated, but on appeal this decision was reversed
on the grounds that love was its own law and that Celie had simply
followed her heart. Irrespective of the various thefts, returns, and
redirections of letters, irrespective of philological betrayals,
mistranslations, and rewritings, the positive principle was one which
admitted the fluidity of relationships over time and thus ack-
nowledged the priority of affectivity over normativity, of desire over
propriety, and of love over positive law. Thersandre had lost the love
of Celie and it was that loss of affection or passion that could neither
be rewritten nor reversed but had simply to be accepted by law and
as law. As for Celian, the proprietorial husband, Celie probably had
both the first and the last word. When Celian returned the first stolen
love letter, Celie had smiled and warned him to be careful of taking
her papers "because next time he might walk off with one of her
lovers' letters and become upset, because a husband who knows how
to live, should be more upset by learning of his wife's lovers than she
would be on learning of his."42
While it is interesting that it is the wife who clearly wields the
greater degree of affective power, a more structural interest attaches
to the husband's continual failure to intercept or divert the love
letters. The correspondence is lodged phantasmatically on the borders
of the legal realm, it obeys its own jurisdiction and laws. It is in this
sense that the amorous correspondence is an emblem of another law.
It represents what Selden termed the law of the first Venus, of desire
or of nature, to which the hermeneutic incompetence of the husband
is but the dim reflection.43 The husband represents a secondary or
positive law, that of the second Venus, a law which is but the shadow
of the first. The law of property and of secular possession, of
propriety, appearance, and prosaic rules is tied not only to the empty
formality of positive law but also to its deceit. Like Hermes, the
husband steals and passes on messages that he neither has title to nor
understands." It is positive law which in this sense fails because it is
inadequate to nature and uncomprehending of relationship. The
husband never understands that crucial message and so remains an
outsider to affective exchanges which he cannot understand, and a
spectator to the amorous life, the fantasies, emotions, writings, and
other realities of his wife. That his wife speaks and writes Latin is
42. Id. at 67.
43. See SELDEN, supra note 26, at 11.
44. On Hermes as messenger and thief, see COSTAS DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERN
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW 32-46 (1990); Peter Goodrich,
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merely the humanistic emblem of his incomprehension of the
differences of gender.
The question of love posed by the case is not only that of the ethics
of desire, of the freedom of the wife to pursue her inclinations outside
the proprietorial bonds of marriage. The case can be read also as an
instance of the letter as the unconscious form of law. What is most
striking about the case is not its substantive narrative, nor the litany
of its passage from laughter to tears, from love to law, from affection
to anger, from one lover to the next. Its significance is altogether
different, it is a matter of form and, put more strongly, of fate. The
formal properties of the various correspondences or letters is of much
greater significance than their content or apparent destination. What
is important is the economy and circulation of letters, their obedience
to a law of desire, to a law of unconscious destination whereby the
letter may always be intercepted, deferred or delayed, but by which
it also always eventually, destinerrantly, arrives. What, therefore,
determines events is not the explicit message or address of the
missive. It is rather the form and circulation of the message which
determines its subsequent meanings. What is significant in the final
analysis is the indirection of address and the mutability of destination,
what has been termed the destinerrancy of the message, its insistence
or unconscious cause.45 The meaning of the final letter, addressed to
Thersandre but intended for the husband, or more precisely intended
to produce effects on the husband and not least a reinterpretation of
previous letters, lies in its positioning, its placement, its form or mode
of address, as much as in its evident content. The hermeneutic
significance of the letter is captured best in the fact that whatever the
nature of its message, whether it is taken as one of pure form or of
a mixed meaning, it is the letter that "insists," that plays the law and
determines the outcomes of the case. The logic of such outcomes
obeys its own imperative: To be in love means to write and to write
means to touch upon a primary law, to touch upon a force-a nature,
desire, or justice-that exceeds both intention and address. The letter,
I will argue, is the pre-eminent form of writing law. Although the
45. On the notion of "destinerrancy," see Jacques Derrida, For the Love of Lacan, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 699, 702 (1995):
As for being shocked to see someone say "we," speaking on his own after the death of the
other: there is nothing to be shocked about. There too, it is one of the best-known
phenomena of the destinerrance which inflicts an internal drift on the destination of the
letter, from which it might never return, but to which we should return.
See also DERRIDA, supra note 29, at 121. The destinerrancy of the letter should not be interpret-
ed as precluding its arrival. It simply implies the failure of conscious causes and meanings, and
so also the priority of unconscious causes. On this important point, see SLAVOJ ZIZEK, Why
Does a Letter Always Arrive at Its Destination?, in ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM: JACQUES LACAN
IN HOLLYWOOD AND OUT 1-28 (1992).
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jurisdictions of the letter vary, they are bound by a similar principle:
for there to be law there must be inscription, and yet inscription is its
own law, and pays its own dues. More than that, inscription takes the
form of the letter and thereby inevitably raises questions of ethics and
of destination, of sending and of receiving. Justice will be understood
as a matter of correspondence.
What is significant initially about the case of Celie is not the
disjunction of love letters and positive law but their proximity. That
proximity is both theoretical and historical, recollecting the common
origin and separate yet parallel development of the two epistolary
forms and their domains of law. In Part II, I will address the
homology between the love letter and legal writing by tracing briefly
the historical commonality and theoretical relation of writ to letter, of
forms of action to forms of writing, in the separate jurisdictions of
love and of secular law. In Part III, I will analyze the place of the
letter, of epistolary and amatory forms, within the tradition of
judgments and courts of love. That history of a distinct jurisdiction, of
another law, raises questions both of justice and of politics, of law and
of writing, of gender and of genre. In its strongest form the argument
will be that the love letter belongs to an alternative public sphere and
to laws whose object is the writing of the soul. The love letter is here
to be understood as an alternative and contingent form of law: it is
both a radical challenge to the boundaries of positive law and an
alternative model of the forms of application, the procedures, spaces,
and objects of justice. The insistence of the love letter in the discourse
of law is the insistence of law's other domains or jurisdictions, the
insistence of the plurality of laws, the insistence of law's openness and
not its closure.
The final theme raised by the history of Celie is concerned with the
politics of discourse which the love letter reveals. In Part IV, I will
suggest that the history of the love letter has a dual significance for
law. It offers the possibility of rewriting law through the analysis of
one of its boundaries, that of the jurisidiction of literature and
specifically the judgments and rules of love. If the love letter is the
unconscious or repressed form of law, if it is what can be termed law's
other, its prior cause, it might be argued finally that the history of
Celie and the fate of the letter both offer an example and a vivid
application of an alternative conception of justice. It is the notion of
justice as correspondence, as a site or space in between subjects and
across which the written is transmitted. The love letter is radical
because it assumes no prior identity or proprietary self. It suggests
instead a space of relationship predicated upon an affective and fluid
sense of self and of its possibilities or styles. Like law and like writing,
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mobile destination. The love letter, the amorous missive, is subject
more than anything else to a law of sending, to a law of indefinite
address. In crossing the distance that separates subjectivities it is
destined, but it may not arrive at its intended or apparent destination.
Following and reinterpreting a classical model, the love letter suggests
forms of justice that pertain to different spheres and spaces of
relation, forms of justice that belong to relays or networks, correspon-
dences or exchanges, that far exceed the languages and boundaries of
what is contemporarily misrecognised as positive law.
II. LETTER AND WRIT
A central feature of the case of Celie is the semiotic principle that
if there is love there must be letters. Love is the occasion of writing,
and writing is the evidence, or the letter is the proof, both of love and
of change, of art and of the space of relation or, philosophically, of
address and of destination. A new love is a new correspondence, the
next exchange of letters. In the case of Celie, the philological nature
of love or passion was explicit, the correspondences in Latin
specifically took up the classical epistolary tradition of desire and
acknowledged both that love occurred through writing and that the
letter was the site, expression, and substance of desire. In the more
contemporary idiom of psychoanalysis, the text or letter is quite
literally the object of desire or the body, the corpus iuris, or the law
of love. Love is in this respect inevitably a matter of writing, and
letters are its necessary yet illicit form. The letter is bound to the
paradox of epistolary love. In one aspect it addresses the impossibility,
the distance, and the illegality of love and of its end, fornication. In
another aspect, the love letter creates the possibility and the space or
freedom to choose a lover or to express desire outside the bond or
tomb of instituted relationships:
For the troubadour and the lawyer, to write is not to give way to
impossibility but rather to put it in place through the act of
writing. In this respect it resembles transference, that other form
of love, by means of which psychoanalysis teaches us to live with
the impossible.46
46. JEAN-CHARLES HUCHET, LrLitRATURE MIIDItVALE ET PSYCHANALYSE 24 (1990); see
also MICHEL SILVESTRE, DEMAIN LA PSYCHANALYSE 131-42 (1987) (discussing the connection
between love and writing); Juliet Flower MacCannell, Love Outside the Limits of the Law, 23
NEW FORMATIONS 25, 25 (1994) (arguing that "love [the love letter] opens where the Symbolic
chain is broken down, revealing something unsayable, even transcendent that escapes its range.
Or something poetic. Words diverted from their purely symbolic-which is to say militantly
meaningless arrangements-become objects in themselves.").
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In arguing that there is both an historical and a doctrinal homology
between love letter and legal writ, I will focus upon three aspects of
the dual development of the epistolary and juridical forms. First, I will
consider briefly the question of origins and love of truth in letters and
in law. The authenticity of the love letter, its authorship or amorous
source, finds a direct reflection in the lawyer's love of letters, in legal
philology and the requirement of originals. Second, I will suggest that
the epistolary and legal forms had a common disciplinary basis in a
branch of rhetoric, the ars dictaminis or art of letter writing. The two
species of letter develop as parallel forms of artes dictandi and if it is
plausible to assert that the love letter represents a greater law, that of
the first Venus, then it is equally feasible to argue that the legal letter
is no more than a sub species of the epistolary genre. I will suggest
finally that there is a substantive homology between love letters and
laws that is played out in the act of writing and the ethics which it
entails. It is not simply that letters establish and map a relationship
but also that the desire expressed in the letter, the desire addressed
to the other, constitutes a novel ethics, and potentially a means of
writing the self. The letter is in legal terms an instrument, an action
or deed, whose original performs (tables or notes) the cause that the
writing inscribes and sends on.
It should be noted finally that my argument is, in historical terms,
self-consciously syncretic. I place disparate periods, distinct genres,
and different juristic traditions in proximity to each other for the
explicit purpose of constructing an argument. The historically and
institutionally specific example of the pr~cieuses will be juxtaposed
with earlier traditions of the notarial and amorous arts. The genealogy
and the political significance of the courts of the ruelle will be traced
by reference to a formbook literature of intimate and amorous letters
that seem both distinct from the novelistic tradition and far removed
from the prolix and inelegant cold prose or litera mortua of the legal
system of writs. As if placing literature side by side with law were not
bad enough, the argument that the love letter both precedes and
dictates the form of legal writing will be made primarily by reference
to that variant local form of Gallic law that developed in England as
the Anglo-Norman ius commune or common law.47 The justification
for such historicist liberties is only partially predicated upon the thesis
that a history of the feminine in the public sphere requires different
rules of historical method, and that its object-the history of the
47. This argument is addressed in more detail in GOODRICH, supra note 25, at 81-89, and
in a more political form in Peter Goodrich, Critical Legal Studies in England: Prospective
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image, of the love letter, of difference-requires a rethinking of what
is to count as proof or as an object of historical investigation. It is also
a grammatological argument that addresses directly the longue durge
or dual structure of the written form, of ratio scripta and fictio iuris,
of written reason and image or fiction of law, in the growth of
western institutions. It is my argument that just as the reason of law
depends upon fiction, so too the scriptural expression of law hides an
epistolarity, an amorous direction or correspondence, a repressed
trauma of origin that is destined contemporarily to return in ever
more positive institutional forms. The history of the legal passion for
texts and specifically for writs, the history of philology as the method
of law, is, in essential respects, definitive of the Western institution.48
The Rhetorical Arts of Legal and Amatory Letter Writing
The lawyer's philological passion and love of literae or texts is not,
however, the most striking feature of the formal homology between
love letters and laws. That law necessitates inscription, and that
inscription is its own law, and must pay its own dues, is less significant
than the specifically epistolary form of legal writing. It has been
insufficiently remarked of the early common law tradition, of its
itinerant courts and itinerant justices, that law was a system not only
of writing, but of writing in the specific form of the letter. What, in
other words, does it mean that the writ was a letter and that the
earliest meaning of the post or postea is a legal one relating to the
sending of writs, records and fines by the protonotaries of the King's
courts to the keeper of writs, the custos brevium?49 Further, what
does it mean that by their own confession lawyers love letters? What
does it mean that they are addicted to law?"° The genre or form of
the letter embraces both love and law not simply for the reason that
both are forms of human relationship but more because both are
concerned with the mapping of relationships, with a war against
48. This argument is made in considerable detail in PIERRE LEGENDRE, LES ENFANTS DU
TExTE. ETUDE SUR LA FONCTION PARENTALE DES ETATS 183-232 (1992).
49. See JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER OR BOOKE CONTAINING THE SIGNIFICATION OF
WORDS 138 (Cambridge, Legat 1607).
50. The notion of being in love with or addicted to law is a common theme in early treatises:
If the language or style do not please thee, let the excellency and the importance of the
matter delight thee, thereby thou shalt wholly addict thyself to the admirable sweetness of
knowledge and understanding: in lectione non verba sed veritas est amanda .... Certainly
the fair outside of enamelled words and sentences, do sometime so bedazzle the eye of the
reader's mind with their glittering show, as they cause them not to see or not to pierce into
the inside matter ... projicit ampullas et sesquipedalia verba ....
SIR EDWARD COKE, REPORTS pt. 3, fol. c7b (London, Rivington 1777); see also WILLIAM
FULBECK, DIRECTION OR PREPARATIVE TO THE STUDY OF LAW; WHEREIN IS SHEWED, WHAT
THINGS OUGHT TO BE OBSERVED AND USED OF THEM THAT ARE ADDICTED TO THE STUDY
OF LAW (London, W.T. Clarke 1829) (1599) (facsimile of first edition).
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distance, with communications between absent parties. To cease to
write would in legal terms be to cease to rule. Similarly, to end a
correspondence was to recognize the end of love or, in the terms used
earlier, the triumph of impossibility over writing. The opposition
between writing and distance is played out in the love letter, in the
form of the antinomy of jouissance and death or, in Julia Kristeva's
words: "If it lives, your psyche is in love. If it is not in love, it is dead.
'Death lives a human life,' Hegel said. That is true whenever we are
not in love or not in analysis."51 To be in love is to write, and each
new love is a new correspondence.
There is, it may be surmised, a multiple significance to the fact that
all the early literary sources of common law refer extensively and
even at times obsessively to the scriptorial functions and offices that
emerge with the early form of a national legal system. 2 Thus Fleta,
in describing the offices attached to the King's Bench, remarks that
there are also in this court clerks (clerici), protonotaries (protonotarii)
and cursitors (cursarii) who enrol pleas and write judicial writs, and
there are two chirographers (cirographarii), who also accompany the
justices in Eyre, concerning whom it is enacted that they are to be
content with four shillings for writing each chirograph, and for writing
a judicial writ, the writer is to receive one penny only.
53
The itinerant character of justice required an elaborate system not
only of inscription and of writing but also of sending, storing,
summoning, tabling, noting, and engrossing. The system which the
English common law adopted was one imported from France, and,
according to Lambard:
[W]riting and writs came also with the Normans, [whereas] the
Saxons (our Ancestors) whose proceedings were de plano, and
without solemnity, did not use (so far as I have hitherto ob-
served) to call the parties by writ or writing, but to send for them
by certain messengers, which they termed Theignes; that is to say
Ministers or servants.54
51. JULIA KRISTEVA, TALES OF LOVE 15 (1987); see also LUCE IRIGARAY, MARINE LOVER:
OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 28 (1991) ("This is the worst peril today, the death that is taken for
life. The death that you forced upon me so that you could control it and resist it and which now
pushes us aside into a mere appearance of living beings.").
52. For discussion of this theme, see PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW 4-20, 126-32
(1986).
53. FLETA 138 (H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles eds., 1955).
54. WILLIAM LAMBARD, ARCHEION OR DISCOURSE UPON THE HIGH COURTS OF JUSTICE
IN ENGLAND 53 (London, H. Seile 1591). For discussion of the uses of writing in early common
law, see M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITrEN RECORD 16-57 (1979); DAVID
MELLINKOFF, LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 116-34 (1963). See also Peter Goodrich, Literacy and
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The writ or letter was initially "a silent messenger" and would bring
the words of the absent party to the ear of the addressee without
voice.5 The letter was to be read, just as the lover's song was to be
sung and her poem intoned.
Initially I will simply note that the early development of the
medieval legal system, the reception of Roman law in Europe and the
expansion of the common law system of writs, coincided with the
establishment of the code of love and the emergence of the poetic and
epistolary traditions of the courts of love. The specific coincidence is
less remarkable than the parallel development of arts of writing or
artes dictandi that governed both letters of law and letters of love.
The formbook literature that dictated the proper forms and expres-
sions of legal missives and lovers' letters was not a diversion or
amusement but rather a code that put in place the possibilities, the
spaces, of the public sphere and of the various institutions or
jurisdictions of relationship. In this aspect it is necessary to remember
that both legal writ and lover's letter served to write the self as action
or as passion, as deed or devotion within the separate jurisdictions of
the public and private, the divergent domains of the political and
affective spheres. What is crucial for my present argument is that both
epistolary enterprises were governed by rhetorical norms of public
speech and of writing and by their correlative codes of ethical action
and of the justice of correspondence.
The ars dictaminis or legal art of letter writing was a medieval
development of a branch of rhetoric.56 Being a rhetorical art its
primary concern was with the means of persuasion through the
construction of a mode of address in the various forms of correspon-
dence. Its focus was thus both upon the person to be addressed and
the contexts and effects of such written speech. The model or form of
the letter was thus based upon a notion of dialogue in which the letter
was conceived as a written form of oral transmission and was to elicit
an effect, a reaction or response. In classical rhetorical terms there
were only two branches of epistola or letter: letters were either official
or intimate, negotiales or familiares.57 The love letter was a species
of intimate or secret letter but it was one which in early rhetorical
theory was not distinguished other than by the substance of its
55. ANDREAS ALCIATUS, DE NOTITA DIGNITATEM 190 (Paris, Cramoisy 1651) ("Quid est
epistola? Tacitus nuncius.").
56. For a critical discussion of this point, see BRIAN VICKERS, IN DEFENCE OF RHETORIC
232-38 (1988).
57. See JAMES J. MURPHY, RHETORIC IN THE MIDDLE AGES 220-55 (1974); see also C. luli
Victoris Ars Rhetorica, in RHETORES LATINI MiNORES 448 (Charles Hahm ed., 1964). See
generally ERNST CURTIUS, EUROPEAN LITERATURE AND THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES (1979)
(discussing ars dictaminis).
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'petition' and the consequent need to keep its subject matter, its
sender and addressee, secret. Whatever the letter, it was to retain the
specified form set out in the principles of letter writing, the rationes
dictandi, the most important of which was the first, the salutation
which was to be appropriate to its addressee and to its cause or
petition.58 What is abundantly clear is that in terms of official
transactions and the business of government, the lawyers borrowed
directly from the ars dictaminis and its established principles and
divisions of the letter.59 In later tradition the protocols of letter
writing were said to constitute the virtue of love, just as much as the
precise wording and due forms of the writ or other legal writing
constituted the force of law.'
In that it was a rhetorical form, the letter was designed principally
to plead or state a cause, to persuade or to move to action. In both
civil and common law, the numerous offices of writing, of sending,
receiving, noting, proclaiming, and filing letters are organized,
therefore, around the act or message which the letter performs or
announces. Early legislation thus took the form of letters patent and
was addressed to specific officials.6" Although later legislation was
more general in its address in that it touched upon all or was sent
erga omnes, to all-to God, the faithful, the Christian, the subject-its
doctrinal function did not greatly differ from earlier forms.62 The
later form provided an explicit recognition of what was implicit
before, namely the ultimate or divine addressee of all correspondence,
of all justice. Early law was addressed to specific correspondents or
recipients, from a sovereign who was explicitly acting vicariously or
as the vicar of God. The usual forms, offices, and functions of the
legal writ or epistle are specific and specifically addressed. Describing
the Court of Exchequer, for example, Sir Thomas Ridley depicts a
sacral system of delegation and inscription, of honor and correspon-
dence. The officials of the court were termed sacerdotes "because
58. On the parts of the letter, see, for example, the work of an anonymous dictator,
Anonymous of Bologna, Rationes Dictandi, in THREE MEDIEVAL RHETORICAL ARTS 5 (James
J. Murphy ed., 1971).
59. See MURPHY, supra note 57, at 263-68.
60. See Du TRONCHET, supra note 34, at 5-6 ("[Tlhe affections are declared in love letters
whose power is that of allowing encounter with others and facilitating the possibility and
pleasure of sincere love, and the declaration of private inventions and imaginations ...."). In
another work, Du Tronchet provides an equivalent depiction of the dependence of government
upon letters. ESTIENNE DU TRONCHET, LETTRES MISSIVES fol. a.iii.a (Lyon, Frellon 1567).
61. For discussion of this point, see Desmond Manderson, Statuta v. Acts: Interpretation,
Music, and English Legislation, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 131 (1995). See also DAVID WILKINS,
CONSILIA MAGNAE BRITANNIAE ET HIBERNIAE AB ANNO MCCCL AD ANNUM MDLXLV
(London, n.p. 1737).
62. See, e.g., WILLIAM RASTELL, A COLLECTION IN ENGLISH OF STATUTES Now IN FORCE
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their office was Deo sacra dare, to sacrifice to God."63 The sacrifice
that constituted the office of lawyer was one that separated the divine
or consecrated order of law from the secular domain of its subjects.
The distance and the division both within and between the orders of
law and of laity necessitated correspondence. The letter traversed the
space of difference just as much as it travelled the itinerant path of
the justices in eyre. The hierarchy of legal honour, in other words,
reflected a divine order of inscription and was expressed in terms of
the various clerical and notarial offices, the notitia imperii and the
order of writings:
[N]ext to the Chancellor or Master of the Rolls, were the clerks,
and others that served in the Rolls, in which the decrees and
rescripts of the Prince, the supplications of the subjects, and the
orders thereupon set down are recorded, laid up and kept, as the
Rolls of Remembrances, of Epistles, Libels, Ordinances, Gifts
and such like.'
The clerks would write and write back, they would send and receive
the post, they would summon, order, grant, and give by epistle, letter,
or writ and the same would be noted, enrolled, scrivened, or
inscribed.
The details of the various offices of the legal postal network and
the varied forms of written salutation and address form a cumulative
evidence of the epistolary structure of legal writing. If we take the
example of written instruments, a comparable form of address is
common to the most diverse kinds of formal legal writing or
obligation. The various forms of legal instrument are collectively
described in William West's formbook the Symbolaeography.65 In
common with legislation and royal charters, the first addressee of
formal writings is mystical, it is memory, posterity, or more directly
the Christian community, the usual address being ad omnibus christi
fidelibus ... salutem. The general addressee of legal language was
thus not the extant community but the audience of record and of
perpetual registration. West therefore defines the contractual writing
or instrument as being distinct from "ordinary letters, private notes,
reckonings and remembrances made by any for a man's own private
use or memory, and from all books or arts, histories, divinitie,
philosophy and such like."66 Where the formal writing differed from
63. SIR THOMAS RIDLEY, A VIEW OF THE CIVILLE AND ECCLESIASTICALL LAW 44 (Oxf-
ord, H. Hall 1676) (1607) (first edition available in British Library).
64. Id. at 61.
65. WILLIAM WEST, SYMBOLAEOGRAPHY WHICH MAY BE TERMED THE ART, DESCRIP-
TION OR IMAGE OF INSTRUMENTS .... OR THE PATERNE OF PRESIDENTS OR THE NOTARIE
OR SCRIVENER (London, T. Wright 1603) (1599) (citing augmented edition).
66. Id. at fol. ASa.
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both private forms of record and other literatures was not in its
structure of address but rather in the coding of that correspondence
as being more than "bare speech" or "ordinary scrivening." Formal
writing belonged to a transcendent order of correspondence, it was
written by the grace of God, dei gratia, and it was capable of
demanding a response not simply from someone addressed now but
from their successors or heirs as well.
The language of divine address is explicitly one of faith and of
defense of the faith. It is also a discourse of love, of amor purus or
spiritual desire. God is addressed through faith, and the essence and
idiom of faith is love. That Latin is the language of such address in
early modern law again reflects not only the encrypted nature of the
correspondence, the equivalent of amorous secrecy, but also the
hierarchical and exclusive nature of this public and professed passion
or faith. Philological love or the lawyer's amor purus, his morbid
belief in the timeless and perfect letter of the law, establishes a
conversation across and in spite of time. It is in essence not a dialogue
with contemporaneity or the living, but rather a fantasmatic cor-
respondence within an exclusive and homosocial professional world
and addressed not to contemporaries or the living but de futuro, from
the dead to the unborn. The language of law was uncorrupted by
speech, it was the inscription of nature, reason manifest, and not some
lesser scrivening.67 The pristine language of precedent and of legal
record was said to speak across the temporality of law's subjects,
conveying a message to an indefinite future time. Even where these
letters of record or this correspondence of tradition was falsified by
living testimony, it still remained true as sent until a writ of error or
countervailing writing was delivered.
Sir John Doderidge records a case that provides a dramatic and
disturbing example of a principle that "if a record once say the word,
no man shall be received to aver; speak against it; or impugn the
same. No though such record contain manifest and known falsehood,
tending to the mischief and overthrow of a person., 68 In the case in
question a number of individuals were outlawed in the King's Bench,
their goods forfeit and their names certified in the Exchequer with an
abstract of their goods. It so happened that by misprision of the Clerk
to the court the name of one individual was included on the list sent
to the Exchequer even though that person was not outlawed. A writ
67. On the relation of legal language to nature, see SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS
LEGUM ANGLIAE 108-09 (London, Gosling 1737) (1470) (best available edition). For discussion
of that theme, see PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO
NOMADIC MASKS 83-95 (1990).
68. SIR JOHN DODERIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER 200 (London, I. More 1631); see also
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was issued. The individual in question came to the court of the King's
Bench and along with a judge of the court testified that he had not
been outlawed and gave evidence that what had been done was the
result of a clerical error or misprision. Justice Skipworth
returned this answer: That although all the justices would now
record the contrary, that they could not be permitted, nor any
credit given thereunto, when as there was a Record extant, and
not Reversed, testifying the same outlawry: yea, the Law so
mightily upholdeth the intended Credit of a Record, that it
preferreth the same before the oathes of men, sounding to the
contrary.
69
If the formality of legal writing is an expression of the divinity of the
word, of the letter's addressee, it is unsurprising that the temporal
exchanges that legal instruments devise or record should also be
structured around a formal sense of correspondence, of signature and
delivery, of address and of sending that exceed their temporal use or
living forms. The deed was delivered dogmatically in just the same
way that the fine or charge on land was not simply to be written
(engrossed) by the chirographer but also sent, tabled and fined in the
courts. 70 It was not enough merely to write, the chirographer had
also to deliver in the eyes of the other, in the forms of an absolute or
atemporal law, because law was in structure rhetorical and in practice
epistolary. Both text and letter of law implied an inscription, sub
specie aeternitatis, and so was addressed to the eye of posterity or the
source of law.
The notary, for William West, was explicitly a species of poet or
rhetorician whose rules of composition, "the tenors and forms of
special instruments," were comparable directly to "the several kinds
and measures of verses, [together with] the laws of versifying" or to
the "tropes, figures, and precepts of rhetoric. 71 Similarly and finally,
at the level of the process of litigation, the forms of writing took the
explicit form of correspondence. 72 The process started with a com-
plaint and answer, followed by replication, rejoinder, and surrejoinder.
The complainant was explicitly termed the orator, the form of the bill
of complaint being listed by West as follows: "[I]t may please your
good lordship, to grant unto your said orator, her majesty's most
69. DODERIDGE, supra note 68, at 201-02.
70. See WEST, supra note 65, at pt. 2, § 170-72.
71. Id. at fol. Cla.
72. See, e.g., SIR EDWARD COKE, A BOOK OF ENTRIES (London, Streeter 1610)
(exemplifying the way in which legislation and writs were formulated and addressed as letters
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gracious writ of subpoena, to be directed to the said H.H." and so on.
The standard form answer was that:
[T]he bill is untrue, uncertain and insufficient in the law to be
answered ... [the orator] out of malice and evil ... conceived
against the defendant, to the intent thereby unjustly to vex and
molest him with tedious travel, being an aged man, and to put
him unto great expense, being very poor; but chiefly to weary,
impoverish and terrify him this defendant.3
The further rules relating to modes of address of instruments
concerned the requirements, known as exceptions, which listed in
minute detail the name, rank, place, occasion, and cause of the
transaction. In all its forms the law was inscribed, and yet, inscription
is its own law and pays its own dues. In relation to law, the dues of
writing, the insistence of the letter, press against the repression barrier
of the constraints or the formalism of the discourse of law, its fear of,
or its distance from, the living. These dues or this insistence may be
summarised as follows. First, the legal writ or written form of
sovereign communication develops from a rhetorical form concerned
with address to an individual or audience and formulated so as to
produce effects of persuasion or action. The legal writ demands either
deed or response at the behest of a superior. It is imperative and if
ignored results in the exile or outlawing of the addressee. The love
letter, by way of comparison, obeys a similar imperative, for "like
desire ... [it] waits for an answer; it implicitly enjoins the other to
reply, for without a reply the other's image changes, it becomes
other.' '74 Second, and inversely, the epistolary form of rhetoric
traverses or transgresses diverse genres but nevertheless retains its
form or its own law. Most broadly, it necessarily transgresses the
contingent boundaries of public and private. The legal writ is
addressed to an individual, a judge in Eyre, an officer of the realm,
or a subject, but has to be delivered and has to be seen to be
delivered in the course of the post. Whether the letter concerns the
king's pleasure-for as Fleta remarks, what pleases the prince has the
force of law 75-or the affective or amorous desire of another subject,
the letter implies an intimacy made public, a private action or
response, in short a correspondence. Third, the letter is formulaic in
structure, which means that it is coded, and whether legal or amorous
73. WEST, supra note 65, at pt. 2, § 68.
74. ROLAND BARTHES, A LOVER'S DISCOURSE: FRAGMENTS 158 (1979); see also
KAUFFMAN, supra note 37, at 303 ("To evoke a response, after all, is one aim of all amorous
epistolary discourse. One asks the beloved questions in the implicit hope and faith that the
beloved will answer, not just once but again and again.").
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it endeavours to restrict its publicity or publication through both seal
and language. What is public, in other words, is the form, the sending
and the arrival of the letter, and not its content: whether it be a
matter of law or love, the epistolary form requires a destination, a
named and exclusive addressee.
That the letter presumes an addressee implies that the letter is
transgressive of genre in a further sense. The letter is personal, it is
defined by the ars dictaminis as a matter of expression of sentiment,
in the form of salutation, persuasion, narration, petition, and
conclusion.76 Even where the letter is borrowed from a formbook,
from West's Symbolaeography or from its amatory equivalent, let us
say from the pseudonymous Philomusus, The Academy of
Complements,77 the letter is a messenger and like language or indeed
as language it is "the messenger of the human mind,"78 or alter-
natively, when written, "the messenger of the absent."79 The letter,
in short, always also has an affective purpose and necessarily engages
sender and recipient in a relationship with both a personal and a
public dimension, with both an emotional and a cognitive content.
The legal letter is nonetheless a letter. Not only does it in historical
terms share many of the substantive features of the love letter, but in
formal terms it does not differ from poetry or the rhetoric of
persuasion except in that it expresses different pleasures and other
desires. The love letter, in history and in theory, expresses a greater
freedom and a more authentic form of correspondence. In this sense
the love letter is the soul of law, it represents the possibility of justice
as the affectivity addressed to the particular correspondent, the
subject who, by virtue of the letter, by virtue of writing, is called but
is not yet before the law. The insistence of the letter in the un-
conscious of law is the insistence of the love letter, the insistence of
other possibilities and potentials derived from the plurality of laws.
The letter is not only a messenger of the mind, it is also depicted
by West as a "confession" and as evidence of what the subject desires
to be done.80 Even in law, it may be hazarded, the letter is linked to
76. See Anonymous of Bologna, supra note 58, at 7.
77. PHILOMUSUS, THE ACADEMY OF COMPLEMENTS WHEREIN LADYES, GENTLEWOMEN,
SCHOLLERS, AND STRANGERS MAY ACCOMODATE THEIR COURTLY PRACTICE WITH MOST
CURIOUS CEREMONIES, COMPLEMENTALL, AMOROUS, HIGH EXPRESSIONS AND FORMES OF
SPEAKING, OR WRITING (London, H. Mosley 1638). For another slightly earlier example, see
NICHOLAS BRETON, CONCEYTED LETTERS, NEWLY LAIDE OPEN: OR A MOST EXCELLENT
BUNDLE OF WIT, WHEREIN Is KNIT UP TOGETHER ALL THE PERFECTIONS OR ARTE OF
EPISTELING (London, B. Alsop 1618).
78. ALCIATUS, supra note 30, at 16, col. 1.
79. ANGEL DAY, THE ENGLISH SECRETORIE OR METHODE OF WRITING OF EPISTLES AND
LETrERS 1 (London, Cuthbert Burby 1607).
80. WEST, supra note 65, at fol. A8a; see also THOMAS PHAYR, A NEW BOKE OF PRESIDEN-
TES, IN MANNER OF A REGISTER (London, Whychurche 1544) (construing the letter as
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desire and to the affective pleasure of the subject-the letter is the
internalization of law and in that specific sense it precedes the law,
the letter is the law. Two themes will focus analysis of the possibilities
contained in that proposition. First, the homology of law and love
letters, of legal writ and amorous correspondence, has been addressed,
if at all, in terms of the priority or prior reality of the legal writ.81 I
will reverse that privilege by arguing that the love letter precedes the
law in precisely the same sense as language or writing precedes and
dictates the terms of law's rule. Furthermore, the desire which
structures all writing finds a comparable expression in both legal writ
and amatory epistle. The themes of fidelity and infidelity, of accep-
tance and rejection, of care and of indifference, and even of conquest
and loss suggest that within their own spheres, the fantasies of love
and law are not so different either in form or substance. Within the
tradition which we know as that of western law, to love is to write,
and to write is to touch upon law. My second focus is therefore
concerned with the relational space as well as the affective idiom that
the letter opens up. The letter exceeds the law and so plays the law,
it is itself an order of law that structures law in the same way as it
structures love.
III. THE CHANCELLERY OF LOVE
In a literal sense the letter writes the self. We write so as to change
ourselves, so as to become ourselves, so as to postpone or lose
ourselves, not through the externality of law but through the
internality of writing as the space of self-fabrication. To write is in this
sense the most powerful of ethical activities, it is both the construction
of a space of possibility for the self and a positioning of the self within
that space and in relation to the other. Writing inserts the self in
history, in the domain of the other, and it is that relation of the self
to writing which suffuses both law and the other genres of correspon-
dence. We should not conclude too readily that lawyers no longer
write, but we can argue that the legal structure of the letter has not
been fully understood, or "known and significant" in law. The letter
represents, I will suggest, another law, an unconscious or fate which
can be addressed more directly through the courts of love than




81. See, e.g., ZIZEK, supra note 5, at 89-94; Renata Salecl, Love: Providence or Despair, 23
NEW FORMATIONS 13, 13-25 (1996).
82. See generally GOING PUBLIC: WOMEN AND PUBLISHING IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE
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In cases of love, the letter is a trope of law. It signals desire and its
destination, but it also marks the fate of love in the form of the
distance that separates lovers. Ironically, therefore, the letter plays the
part of signifying the limitation or mortality of love, its subjection to
and rebellion against law.83 The trope or role of the letter can be
understood initially in terms of an internalized exteriority. A letter is
written by a subject, it is written to the other as the object of desire
and yet once sent it is beyond all redemption or recall. Once sent, the
subject's fate is sealed, and the letter in its turn becomes an absolute:
It takes on the role of law and determines the outcome of love
without further intervention. This absolute or spiritual and so destined
quality of the love letter is apparent from early within the tradition
of amorous missives. The love letter is addressed to the space or
domain of love and because that space is one of affectivity, because
it is an imaginary domain across which correspondence occurs, the
letter itself becomes an exterior force or law. It is law in several
senses. Within the doctrine of love, amorous passion is a divine force,
a law of the first Venus, and it dictates the terms, intensities, and
direction of affection. The earlier courts of love and all of the
formbooks of love letters are unanimous in referring the lover's
passions to the deity of love, to the divinity or other that presides
over and demarcates, that writes invisibly, the narrative and drama of
love. Love is a virtue dictated by natural law and one of the primary
purposes of the collections of love letters is precisely that of showing
"that love is a sacred desire ... without which we would be deprived
of reason and human society."'
The subjection of the domain of love to the principles or law of
correspondence dictated by a God of love is a theme which can be
found throughout the tradition of amorous missives. One popular
collection of diverse forms of letters begins a letter to a mistress in
typical style by referring to: "That powerful Deity ... [which] has at
this time manifested his sovereignty over me, who being taken in the
snare of love, and fettered in the bonds of affection am in the same
predicament of passion ... ,85 While love is clearly and consistently
depicted in terms of a domain ruled by a higher law and is perceived
as a progressive spiritual endeavour, it is also a domain of chance or
(discussing women's letters and the public sphere); Janet Altman, Women's Letters in the Public
Sphere, in id. at 99 (discussing same).
83. See, e.g., HENRY STATEN, EROS IN MOURNING 7-17 (1995) (arguing that mourning is
intrinsic to the structure of love); see also JACQUES DERRIDA, MEMOIRES: FOR PAUL DE MAN
6-13 (1986); GOODRICH supra note 25, at 16-30 (suggesting that in this sense, the love letter
represents the revolt of desire against the institution).
84. Du TRONCHET, supra note 34, at 6.
85. NICHOLAS BRETON, A POSTE WITH A PACKET OF MAD LETTERS 2 (London, John
Marriot 1633).
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fortune. The spiritual and empowering quality of love not only reflects
the divinity of its source-love is a higher law-but is equally
expressed in the advocacy of the love letter. A very typical argument
within the letters of love is the admonition of those who refuse to
love or who have abandonned all amorous correspondence.86 Thus
one of the first and most frequently repeated of love letters is
addressed to those who will not love. The second letter in Estienne
du Tronchet's highly successful collection is addressed to someone
who prefers not to love.87 The appropriate response was as follows:
The law and majesty of love cannot be contradicted. By looking
at that law you can see how heretical and stubborn it would be
never to want to love and never to suffer someone to love you,
and to refuse to be converted ... by services, by prayers, by
admonitions, by the menaces of the justice of love. I fear that
you will suffer worse punishment than Narcissus .... 88
Love for the lover is the presence of God on earth. More than that,
love creates a space in which the lover writes herself and for which
reason the pricieuses were so concerned to reform the language and
discourse of affections. The space of love was the space of writing the
self.
The divine regency of the domain of love, the laws of literary self-
creation through love letters, through the books of love, finds further
expression not only in the absolute power of love but also in the
exterior or real quality of the rules and the judgments that dominate
the space of correspondence. The writer of the letter, the lover, can
neither know nor otherwise control the destiny of the epistle or the
fate of love. The letter exceeds its author and so potentially can
change her by returning in a different form, by falling into other
hands or by betraying secrets both of passion and of infidelity. In
other words, the letter becomes the law, both by virtue of its entry
into an external domain of relationship, and by dint of its ack-
nowledgement of the difference that constitutes the relationship of
love. The domain of love, and indeed the duty to love, are both
expressions of an economy of desire which recognizes that love takes
place between different subjectivities and by implication that it does
not belong to either one of the parties to amorous exchange. Such a
proposition can be illustrated briefly by a further case concerned
directly with the relation of love and law.89
86. See, e.g., PHILOMUSUS, supra note 77, at 5-9; Du TRONCHET, supra note 60, at fol. a, 3a;
D'URFt, supra note 24, at 536.
87. See DU TRONCHET, supra note 34, at 29.
88. Id. at 30.




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1997
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 9: 245
A young Prince was in love with a woman, a prdcieuse, called
Aristie. He would visit her every night. A friend of his, Theodate, was
also in love with Aristie and would also visit her at night after the
Prince had left. Theodate had a valet whom he treated very badly.
The valet knew his secret and because he was so ill-used by Theodate
he broke the code of silence and told the Prince of his rival. He
further promised to inform the Prince when Theodate was with
Aristie so that the couple could be surprised together. The Prince told
a confidant of this plan. The confidant was a friend of Theodate's and
warned him of the scheme. Theodate gave his valet a letter addressed
to a friend of his who lived a considerable distance away and told him
to deliver it. The valet left with the letter but was drowned when the
boat he took for part of the journey sank. Theodate was pleased when
he learned this news, whereas the Prince was saddened because he
now feared that he would never learn the truth. Some time later the
Prince was walking by the coast when his attention was drawn to a
body that had been washed up on the shore. It was the valet, and
when searched he was found to have the letter still in his pocket. The
Prince opened the letter. In it, Theodate asked the friend for a favour,
which was to get rid of the man who delivered the letter, namely the
valet. The Prince ordered the arrest of Theodate for conspiracy to
murder and banished Aristie.
The trope of the letter is peculiarly strong even though it is only
indirectly a letter of love. The anecdote belongs within the genre of
historia calamitatum-the story of misfortunes-but it invokes many
of the key topics of the questions of love. It is striking, first, for the
homosexual character of the various amorous exchanges. The case is
more directly concerned with competition and signification between
men than with a love between the sexes. It is in that sense proprietary
and homosocial in its structure, but it also raises more classical and
equivocal questions of love. If one's lover takes another lover, is it
better to share one's love or to end it altogether? If a servant or
confidante breaks their trust and confesses or reports a love affair,
what is the appropriate punishment? Is a subject bound to defer to
the sovereign, or to hierarchy, in matters of amorous pursuit? Is it
better to know of an infidelity or to ignore it and to continue to love?
Is it appropriate to endeavour to prove what is learned of a lover by
means of breach of confidence and faith? These questions do not
receive any direct answer in this particular case. The law is rather
enacted through the sending of the letter: the letter dictates the law
both in surviving the demise of its bearer and in fulfilling its terms or,
more metaphorically, in arriving at its destination without being
opened. As in the history of Celie, the letter here circulates in
indeterminate ways and with indirect effects. The valet is punished for
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his infidelity. Theodate is equally punished for mistreating his servant
and for sending him to his death. The Prince gains nothing from the
letter save the knowledge or at least confirmation that he has been
betrayed by Aristie and the right to exercise judgment in response to
that betrayal. Aristie, the object of so much desire, is banished, but
under the circumstances that is probably as much an external
expression of her interior state as it is a novel punishment or release.
The issue which I wish to pursue is a rather different one: In each
instance what was crucial was not so much the content of the letter
but rather the space of love-of correspondence-itself. In this
instance it is thus the envelope rather than the letter that counts and
makes the law of love possible, just as it is the space of relationship
that precedes and determines the occasions of love.
What is interesting about the history of Aristie is the independence
of the letter from the immediate purposes of those who send, carry,
and receive it. The letter acts on its own, or has its own meaning, not
least by virtue of surviving the death of its messenger and arriving at
an alternative destination. The letter determines the meaning and the
outcome of the case for all the parties. It is the means of transmission
of law. It is the law, beyond the death of its bearer and despite its
unexpected arrival, despite its being lost or deferred in the course of
the post. In short, the letter arrives, like law or like fate, as the
necessary but indifferent messenger bearing the meaning of the other.
I will address one aspect of that deferral or indeterminacy of destina-
tion. The letter opens a space of possibility, it represents a transcen-
dent meaning, one which exists between the sender and recipient as
a site of possibility or an unmapped domain. It is because it can never
in the end be known that the letter will arrive at its designated
destination that the formal properties of correspondence have such
dramatic significance. Nor can it be known that the letter will be read,
a point which has a peculiar significance in a more classical case of
love reported by Francois Callires in his Nouvelles amoureuses of the
latter quarter of the seventeenth century.
A Marquis of distinction, who "never had any profession save that
of agreeably passing his time with the other sex," fell in love with the
wife of a rich merchant.9" Although aware that it was hard to find
merit in the bourgoisie and that falling in love did not always lead to
the most satisfactory affairs, he endeavoured over time to seduce the
merchant's wife. The couple spent much of their time together and
the merchant's wife slowly succumbed to the Marquis' discourses of
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seduction. The husband, whose head was full of business and details
of trade, gradually became jealous of the time and attention that his
wife was showing to the Marquis. The matter came to a head when,
looking for his wife, he came upon her and the Marquis in a park,
staring into each others eyes. He began to watch her movements
obsessively and to remonstrate and plead with her not to see her
suitor again. This she was eventually forced to promise although only
after many tears and much resistance. The merchant even then did
not believe her word and constantly placed obstacles in the way of her
leaving the house or visiting anyone but her parents. He also
employed a lackey specifically to watch over her every move and to
report it to him.
The difficulties imposed upon the lovers had the effect of inflaming
their passions and forcing the Marquis to adopt ever more ingenious
methods of communicating with the wife. On the occasion in question
the Marquis dressed up as an old woman begging for alms and placed
a letter in the hands of the wife complaining of his unhappiness and
begging for a rendezvous. The wife acceded to this request in the
following way. A short time later the husband had to leave Paris for
the country on urgent matters of business. He tried to persuade his
wife to accompany him, but she refused. He therefore left the lackey
behind with strict instructions to watch his wife constantly. On the
appointed day of the merchant's departure the Marquis disguises
himself most meticulously in the drab grey and dirty costume of a
bearer of letters (porteur des lettres) or what we would now call
postman.91 He also takes a hundred pages of paper and folds then
as letters, carefully placing a blank letter addressed to the merchant
at the bottom. He then goes and waits across the street from her
house. Once he has seen the merchant and the other servants leave
the house, he presents himself at the house and the moment the
lackey opens the door he hands him a letter addressed to the
merchant. The lackey gives the letter to the merchant's wife. She
pretends not to have any change with which to pay for the delivery
of the letter and so sends the lackey out of the house to change a bill.
While the lackey is out of the house, the wife sends the Marquis to
her bedroom and shuts the door. When the lackey returns with the
change, she tells him that she had found some change in another
pocket (dans une autre poche) and had sent the postman on his
way.92 The wife then goes to church with the lackey and on returning
goes to her room.
91. Id. at 20.
92. Id. at 21.
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A love scene ensues and the couple stay together for the rest of the
day. When night comes, the Marquis refuses to leave. While they are
still arguing about this, the merchant returns. The Marquis is forced
to climb out of the window and into the yard of a neighboring house
owned by a lawyer. There he is apprehended by a servant who takes
him to be a burglar and he is arrested. Unable to give the reason for
his presence without betraying the secret of his affair with the
merchant's wife, .the Marquis is forced to choose between amour
propre and love of another. Having frequently declared that he loved
her more than himself, the Marquis sacrifices himself and is
imprisoned as a thief.
The case revolves around a series of appearances or simulations, as
well as disguises and displacements. The most significant of these is
the blank page, folded as a letter, addressed to the merchant and
delivered to his house. The letter is the means of entry into love
although ironically in this instance the letter is a blank sheet of paper.
Let us say that the blank letter represents the possibility of writing the
self rather than its prescription. It is the carrier of truth as an empty
place or space rather than as a substantive referent or content. More
than that, the empty page directs attention away from questions of
content and indeed of delivery and towards the image of a blank
sheet or empty envelope. The case revolves around the letter as a
form, around the absolute nudity of oneiric content, around epis-
tolarity as "the use of the letter's formal properties to create
meaning."93 However defined, the letter bears the double mark of a
literal absence enclosed in a material presence, an absence addressed
and delivered. This lack of writing, as if the address alone were
sufficient, does not mean that there is no message. It suggests rather
that the message is figured not by words but by the messenger and
that in consequence the letter is in this instance but a sign of a more
corporeal writing or bond.
There is a curious poetry to the case of the imprisoned lover. With
respect to the letter, it can be recounted in terms of the indirection of
correspondence: The lover delivers a letter addressed to the absent
husband, the wife receives this empty envelope or blank page and
sends her husband's representative, the lackey, to exchange a bill, a
note, another letter. While the various letters circulate, we might
almost say go unread, the lovers consummate their love. If we were
to interpret the case as an allegory of interpretation it would be
tempting to read the message of the non-message, the meaning of an
93. JANET G. ALTMAN, EPISTOLARrrY: APPROACHES TO A FORM 96 (1983); see also
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absent writing, as an allegory of the lover's discourse. The empty
envelope is first a sign of the secrecy of correspondence, and of
conversation between lovers. The code of love, the twelfth century
compilation of rules for amorous exchange, insists upon the secrecy
of letters. In one of the judgments of love based upon that code it is
held: "Nor should they stamp letters sent to each other with their own
seals, unless they have secret ones known to none except themselves
and their confidants. By this means their love will always be preserved
undamaged."94 Similarly Ovid in Ars amatoria urges secret cor-
respondences to be conducted via a confidante who should hide the
messages on her person. He further advises that if this method is
discovered,
use your confidante's body for paper, write a note on her back.
A letter too is safe and escapes the eye when written in new
milk: touch it with coal dust and you will read . .. or write in
moist oil of linseed: the seemingly blank tablet will preserve your
hidden words.95
To which it might be added that nothing will hide the message so
completely as an empty envelope or blank page. The act of sending
becomes the message, the empty envelope the sign of entry into the
space of love.
The secrecy of the amorous letter suggests an outlaw or op-
positional writing. It marks the politics of the epistolary not only as
marginal to genre and law, but also as an intimate and radical
challenge to the established order of discourse. In Kristeva's words:
"Love always contains some element of love of power ... [and] no
matter what it is, love brushes us up against sovereignty."96 That
encounter with sovereignty or law can be reconstructed in various
ways, all of which repeat in different forms the interconnection, the
indissoluble opposition, the bond that ties the love letter to law. First,
and in the context of the blank page ironically, the love letter belongs
to rhetoric and specifically to poetics and as such it introduces the
image or figure into writing and so also into the margins of secular
law. At the level of doctrine, the love letter here mixes genres and
challenges law, because any play upon the order and gender of
established genre is a threat or challenge to the legality of reason and
the system of writing law. The letter that delivers a blank page
delivers a figure or image and the image, even or particularly when
it is an image of nothing, when it is the blank space of amorous
94. CAPELLANUS, supra note 37, at 271.
95. OviD, THE ART OF LOvE 233, II. 620-30 (Peter Green ed., Penguin Books 1982).
96. KRISTEVA, supra note 51, at 9; see also PIERRE LEGENDRE, Protocole de la lettre
d'amour, in PAROLES POtfTIOUES PCHAPIES DU TEXTE (1982) (articulating a similar point).
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possibility, has a special and even heretical power. In Barthes's
memorable analysis, the figurative quality of the lover's language is
to be understood in terms of words that move, words that are "the
body's gesture caught in action. . . .[The lover] struggles in a kind of
lunatic sport, he spends himself like an athlete; he 'phrases,' like an
orator .... The figure is the lover at work."97 The image, in short,
is active and amatory, and the space of the amatory, as poetry has
long recognized, is writing. The force of the written, invoked here by
an image, is the force of a space of alterity, a space beyond the self,
in which "I becomes an other."98 The love letter, as poetics and as
writing, breaks down identity, it takes away the boundary of the "I"
and rewrites it as style, aesthetic, or hallucination.
It should not take much to persuade an academic audience, and yet
perhaps it is at times the most recalcitrant or dead of audiences, that
writing is an ontological pursuit. "One writes," Foucault famously
remarked, "in order to become other than what one is,"99 so as to go
beyond the self, so as to invent a self. In his work on The Care of the
Self Foucault links sexuality to the possibility of a creative politics,
and the style or aesthetics of self-fashioning to the encounter with
otherness that change or becoming necessarily entail."° To identify
with one's desire is to open oneself to the possibility of new forms of
relationship. In another formulation "you are free to construct your
reality as a more or less fragile border of your love life." ' Such an
inversion of the style of self and of writing allows us now to attempt
a more political reformulation of the love letter as law.
If the love letter is not viewed as a politically significant form of
writing, if the fantasms of abandonment and desire of which the letter
writes seem distant from the domain of institutional relations, that is
because they are defined as part of a private and inconsequential
sphere of the self. It is associated at best with the literary tradition
and feminine fantasms of amorous power."2 If the love letter marks
the threat or possibility of change or of becoming other, then for the
masculine it represents the threat of self abandonment, the threat of
love, of becoming a little feminine, a little alive, a little mad. For the
feminine, by contrast, the movement beyond the self is a movement
into politics and into law. What I would like to suggest is that whether
97. BARTHES, supra note 74, at 3-4.
98. KRISTEVA, supra note 51, at 5.
99. DAVID HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT, TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 76 (1995).
100. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE CARE OF THE SELF 37-68 (1986); see also JULIA
KRISTEVA, NEW MALADIES OF THE SOUL 3-27 (1995).
101. KRISTEVA, supra note 51, at 8.
102. See, e.g., PELOUS, supra note 2, at 44-50; Maclean, La voix des precieuses et les d~tours
de l'expression, in PRPSENCES FtMININE: Ln-rRATURE ET SOCIP-T EN XVIIP SItCLE FRANCAISE
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public or private, literary or legal, the letter shares its fantasmatic
form of desire; it writes the self. To understand the homology of love
letters and laws we need merely to distinguish the differing content of
the desires expressed and the different degrees of directness with
which they are expressed. And we need also to recognize the
antipathy of law towards its boundaries, its weakness when faced with
its own illusions:
Illusion no longer has the freedom of the city. It is no longer the
companion, the adornment of life. It fascinates like something
beyond good living that must be expelled, wiped out of everyday
life. The fact that illusion, in the final analysis, determines the
laws of society cannot and must not be seen. 03
To address the love letter seriously is to take the self, the culture
of being, the meaning of relationship, and the care of the soul as
public issues and as objects of serious social thought. That, in a grand
historical sense, is the political project of the love letter, and it is
aimed at nothing less than the subversion or transformation of
institutions as spaces of relationship. From the epoch of courtly love
to the present day, the love letter has always had ethical and
feministic implications." The love letter expressed the priority of
desire over duty, of freedom of choice over marital subjection, of
feminine autonomy over property interest.10 5 The love letter and the
love affair were the real escapes, the vivid fantasms of the married
woman and of the unhappily confined. The question to be posed of
that fantasm of love is not whether it was real, or whether it existed,
but rather the opposite, namely, in what sense do we exist without it?
Such is a question of value, a matter of ethics, a case for the courts of
love.
The ethical and political origin of the love letter can be elaborated
in terms of two further specific features. In challenging the ordained
or patristic form of marriage, and the legality of restraining a
woman-a femme covert-to an unchosen partner, the love letter
challenges law with desire. It does so in a very specific form. The love
letter addresses a singular other and endeavours to build a relation-
ship with that other in the face of law and of propriety. The relation-
ship may be virtual, fantasmatic, fragmentary, yet it plays the law both
by mimicking the rhetorical structure of the writ and by dictating a
course of events in sovereign terms. In addition, the love letter lodges
the legal at the level of being, it faces the law with a singular relation
103. IRIGARAY, supra note 51, at 99.
104. See ALTMAN, supra note 93, at 1-11; KAUFFMAN, supra note 37, at 279-311; Altman,
supra note 82, at 99-116.
105. See DEJEAN, supra note 4, at 85-93.
282
38
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol9/iss2/1
Goodrich
and says "either I love, or I die." In more contemporary and less
dramatic terms, the love letter does not represent an outside or other
of law, it represents a difference, an internal alternative, the pos-
sibility of other jurisdictions and other laws. In rhetorical terms we
can return to the blank letter as the sign of a space of possibility. The
function of ethics and the role of the love letter are alike that of
creating empty spaces between lovers, between friends, between
siblings, spaces within which new forms of relationship and new
formulations of identity are possible. The love letter, one might say,
dwells contemporarily within the indeterminacy of law, in the not yet
written of legality, in the possibility of justice.
IV. TRUTH AND TRANSGRESSION IN THE DOMAIN OF LOVE
The affect or authenticity that is harbored unwittingly, or simply
repressed, in the history of law's passion for writ, the philological
apprehension of an indeterminacy or possibility inhabiting the
"ghostly realms" of the text, of its interpretation and transmission, can
be illustrated by an anecdote from the Renaissance humanist lawyer
Jan Luis Vives. It is a narrative of the repressed affectivity of law, of
displaced obsession and of the unwitting or simply "other worldly"
amatory attachment of lawyers. In the course of a discussion of the
laws of marriage, and specifically of the spiritual as opposed to
physical sources of unity or affinity within wedlock, Vives offers the
following curious reminiscence:
[W]hen I was in Paris, I talked with Guillaume Budd, at his own
house and his wife came by .... He said to me "this is my wife
which so diligently follows my pleasure, that she entreats my
books no worse than her own children, because she sees my love
of study so well .... .""
Bud6, possibly the greatest of the humanist lawyers who founded the
post-glossatorial historical tradition of legal scholarship," 7 was
happy to abandon his children and to ignore his wife because his
principal commitment and love, his greatest addiction, was expended
upon texts of law.
In even stronger terms, Bud6 elsewhere describes a life-long
infidelity to his wife and family, a "sweet loving companionship" or
affair which he had pursued from his youth to his old age.' His
confession of faithlessness is expressed in troubled but direct terms:
106. JAN LuIs VIVES, DE INSTITUTIONE FOEMINAE CHRISTIANAE fol. Z, la (London, Wykes
1523).
107. See generally DONALD KELLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN HISTORICAL
SCHOLARSIP: LANGUAGE, LAW, AND HISTORY IN THE FRENCH RENAISSANCE 53-87 (1970).
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"I must admit that I have also a second spouse (altera coniux) whom
I call Philologia."'°9 It is to Dame Philologia that, from an early age,
Budd elsewhere relates having "consecrated uniquely all the ardour
of my soul and all the passion of my nature .... in an absurd and
exclusive love.""' Dame Philologia was Bud6's other wife, his lover,
his sweet companion, his obsession."' She was both the spirit of
Latinity and the text of Roman law from which the ius commune or
universal law of Europe was constructed. What should also be noted
is that this was an obsession with texts, a love of dust and death, of
history, and not of life or living beings. The historical coincidence of
philological and legal passion can be elaborated much further in the
specific technical terms of the scriptural development of early modern
western law.
The historical link between philology and law, between the Latin
tradition and the legal form, is expressed quite explicitly and
repeatedly in amatory terms by the early glossatorial tradition.
Philology is another name for law, and etymologically it hardly needs
be noted that the word philology means love of words, and more
broadly the expression, the speech, the letters, or the laws of love. l'2
Philology is the lawyer's figure of desire, she is the "Lady of
Learning" and lawyers are her "chiefest darlings."'1 3 It is not simply
that the tradition is a textual one. It is more that law in the west
originated-we might say contingently arrived-as a correspondence
from Rome, misplaced or redirected through Byzantium and the
Corpus Iuris Civilis compiled by Justinian." 4 The original text of
Justinian's law is described by Francois Hotman as being "guarded
like a precious and sacred relic, only rarely being shown, at night,
surrounded by candles and torches-thus did the ancient mystagogues
show their sacral law to the faithful."'1 5 The legal tradition was built
from the fragments of an obscure legal past and from what the
109. Id. at 43.
110. Id. at 45.
111. Id. at 47, 143.
112. For the best discussion of this theme, see FRIEDRICH NIETzsCHE, We Philologists, in
THE CASE OF WAGNER 111 (1911).
113. JOHN SELDEN, THE HISTORIE OF TrrHES, at xix-xx (privately published, 1618)
(collection in British Library). On the relation of law to philology, see KELLEY, supra note 107,
at 53-87.
114. See generally PETER GOODRICH, The Unconscious is a Jurist: An Introduction to the
Work of Pierre Legendre, in LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A LEGENDRE READER 1, 1-33
(1997) (discussing this phenomenon).
115. See FRANCOIS HOTMAN, ANTI-TRiBONIAN OU DISCOURS D'UN GRAND ET RENOMMt
IURISCONSULTE SUR L'ESTUDE DES LOIX 120-29 (Paris, Perrier 1603). For discussion of
Hotman's analysis of the reception of Justinian's Corpus furis, see GOODRICH, supra note 67,
at 83-108.
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glossators termed the spirit of Latinity.116 Its major crises were over
the loss, interception, or rewriting of a correspondence in a foreign
language and sent from an archaic past. The lawyer was lovesick for
a lost original, he mourned the passing of a textual system of reasons,
rules, and laws that had, or so he imagined, at one time in the past
been complete. He mourned a relay or network, an imperial
correspondence, which he ceaselessly transcribed and endeavoured to
reconstruct. The jurist or lawyer sought to expound a logic of missives
or messages. In slightly more brutal terms, "transmission of law, love
at the level of the social, is not a matter of thought .... [J]urists do
not have the pretention of thinking, they practice the social art of
putting texts into circulation. And it is for that reason that the
company of lawyers is usually dreaded ....
There is of course a spiritual or more properly dogmatic dimension
to philological passion, to Bud6's literarum studium (study of
texts), 1 8 or to the humanist lawyer's obsession with lost originals
and abandonned laws. It is possible to hazard a hypothesis: There is
a common structure to the lawyer's love of letters and the passion of
amorous correspondence, but it is one that diverges in its practice as
sharply as the historical jurisdictions of public and private, or the
boundaries of gender and genre. Thus in a relatively unexceptional
statement of the rules of amorous correspondence, the galant Charles
Cotin insists that one should never keep one's own love letters: "I
never keep a copy but always send the original. I believe that one
should write as one speaks, and one should not keep a register of
one's letters any more than one should of one's conversations.' 1 9
There are, in other words, only originals of love, and it is those
originals, the letters or words of love that both are, and express, the
lover's passion, the lover's law. What is striking is that the lover sends
the original, that she writes authentically, under the erasure and
reflexivity of correspondence, rather than in the proprietary and
retentive mode of law. Law shares the lover's concern with the
structural significance of originals-with authenticity and the iconic
status of written expressions-but it keeps those originals, because, it
116. On latinitas, see PIERRE LEGENDRE, L'EMPIRE DE LA Vt RiT9 153 (1984):
Through the narrowness of its style, scholasticism set Roman law in motion, in the form
of a legendary genealogy of the discourse of the law. This recourse to genealogy, that is to
say, to the chart of descent of names-names of authors, names of texts, names of
institutions-presents itself, according to the scholastic labour of qualification, as the time
or the times of law.
117. Id. at 160. Legendre has discussed this theme at length in a series of other works. See,
e.g., LEGENDRE, supra note 48, at 108-17 (1992).
118. See BUDs, supra note 108, at 143.
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may be ventured, it does not dare to face the erasure of sending or
the openness and possibility of authentic reflexivity.
The love of originals and the belief that what comes first is both
true and to be loved, is a foundational principle of legal method. 1"
The origin of positive law is an immemorial or natural past whose
original has always already been sent, invisibly repeated and further
sent on. In terms of legal doctrine, there is an originary correspon-
dence which occurs between the author or source of law-Deo
auctore-and the legal tradition. Law is a matter of originals because
it is always bound to the inscription of prior forms. Legal writing is a
correspondence, a writing that is always a rewriting of invisible or
unknowable sources, of precedents which repeat or customs which
inscribe a prior and superior law. In doctrinal terms, knowledge of law
is knowledge of things divine and human, of God's law and of the law
of the sovereign. 121 With respect to the higher law, that of the first
Venus, that of nature, God, or conscience, love is the immediate and
profoundest form of knowledge. Doctrine explicitly dictated that the
texts or signs through which such law was to be known were to be
read through faith, through an Augustinian caritas or love. 22 Where
the correspondence of the lover must on each occasion reinscribe the
lover's passion, and so send an original, a quality or value created
through writing, the lawyer, as scribe or cleric, had a more passive
and arguably morbid task. It was that of preserving the originals of a
past love or correspondence, the missives of a divine subjection and
its cadaverous or textual forms. The legal obsession with preserving
the original threatened to erase the practice of love or the affectivity
of law. 2'
There could be no doubt, however, that the divine correspondent
loved its subjects or was there for those that loved the divinity in
return. Such a love was textual in that it was only through the word,
120. On the legal compulsion to find originals, and to define the original as instar omnium,
as the beginning of everything, see JOHN SELDEN, TITLES OF HONOUR at fol. C4b (London, W.
Stansby 1614) ("[Tjhe best or first I took always for instar omnium."). On the theme of the
"immemorial" origin as first law, see COKE, supra note 50, at pt. 4, fol. Zca; HOTMAN, supra
note 11, at 126-27.
121. The classical source is recorded in JUsTINIAN, DIGEST 1113 (1.1.10.2) (Alan Watson ed.
& Alan Watson et al. trans., 1985) (534 A.D.) ("Iuris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum
return notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia."). As regards the common law tradition and its
reception of the Justinian conception of the dual law (utrumque ius), see SIR JOHN FORTESCUE,
DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE, in THE WORKS OF JOHN FORTESCUE 193 (London, private
distribution 1869) (collection in British Library).
122. See SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 35-44 (D.W. Robertson trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill 1958) (ca. 427). For a discussion of the reformation debate on the relation of text
and tradition to the divine source, see GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 53-82.
123. See Comelia Vismann, Cancels: On the Making of Law in Chanceries, 7 LAW &
CRITIQUE 131, 131-51 (1996); see also PETER GOODRICH, Eating Law: Commons, Common
Land, Common Law, in GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 72-95.
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through scripture or through tradition, that the source of law, the
object of love, could be known. That textual relation, that correspon-
dence, instituted the space within which the higher being, divinity or
truth, God or law, could be known. The reference to a higher law of
love, to an original in nature or structure can be reformulated in
psychoanalytic terms that embrace both love letters and law's letters.
The original is the letter that arrives. It is fate or law, the missive that
arrives, contingently yet exigently, at its human destination. In its
most portentous sense the letter is the real, it is death:
A common pre-theoretical sensitivity enables us to detect the
ominous undertone that sticks to the proposition 'a letter always
arrives at its destination': the only letter that nobody can evade,
that sooner or later reaches us, i.e. the letter that has each of us
as its infallible addressee, is death. We can say that we live in so
far as a certain letter still wanders around looking for us."2
Within its divergent jurisdiction, love, just as much as law, is amor
fati, the positive act of embracing or making something out of destiny.
What is significant is what in phenomenological terms would be best
described as an interior exteriority, an interior sense of an exterior
fate, towards which all writing is addresssed and bound:
[3 June 1977] Yes you were right, henceforth, today, now, at
every moment, on this point of the carte, we are but a miniscule
residue 'left unclaimed': a residue of what we have said to one
another, of what, do not forget, we made of one another, of what
we have written one another. Yes, this correspondence, you're
right, immediately got beyond us, which is why it should all have
been burned, all of it, including the cinders of the un-
conscious-and 'they' will never know anything about it."z
Love mimics nature and each correspondence in its turn seeks to
inscribe a letter that will not fail, an intimacy absolutely bound to us,
to you and I. The original was equally in legal terms source, fate, and
truth. It was instar omnium or the beginning of all and so, wherever
possible, was to be both venerated and repeated. Its failure, however,
resided in its being a restrictive love, a passion for the dead, for the
custodial and curatorial, for objects without voice, for letters that
could no longer correspond. The tradition of law is in this sense a
repressed tradition of love letters.
The common object of the two systems of letters and their common
dependence upon criteria of truth and fidelity can be adduced further
by reference to decisions in the courts of love. The tradition of legal
124. ZIZEK, supra note 45, at 20-21.
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letter writing gains many expressions in the history and judgments of
the women's courts. It is not only that the cases and questions of love
represent a literary tradition, they also devise and develop a legal
jurisdiction and procedure of trial. The status and legality of that
jurisdiction is not so much a question of history as it is an ethical and
political issue. The value of such a jurisdiction and form of writing
will depend upon the importance that our culture attributes to, or is
willing to recognise in, questions of lifestyle, of aesthetics and
relationship, pleasure and love. What cannot be doubted is that the
traditions of legal writ and love letter developed out of the same
rhetorical genre and enjoyed a parallel historical development. The
quaestiones disputatae of the glossators were matched by the quaes-
tiones amoris of the courts of love. The writ system of chancery did
not differ greatly from the letters of pardon, remission or summons
that were inscribed in the Chancelerie d'amours.26 Both systems
were fashioned upon the written form of conversation and in principle
at least both systems were addressed to the subject in his or her or its
uniqueness. Each system sought to do justice to the subject as she
appeared before either law or love. In that the language of love and
the ethics of relation are of greater accessibility and more immediate
importance or at least of greater everyday significance than the rules
of law, it can be argued that maior lex amor est, that love is the
greater law.127 Even if that argument will at first fail, the secondary
implication seems irrefutable: the form of the love letter and the
jurisdiction and casuistry of love must be accorded the attention of
political possibility. The question to be raised is what such a pos-
sibility would mean or to where such letters should be sent.
In cases of love, the love letter is a trope of law. It refers most
directly to the general ethical requirement that lovers create a space
between themselves that is both open and secret, both publicised
through the writing of letters and kept secret by the alternative means
of their delivery, as well as by the use of codes and the absence of
signatures. The love letter, as I have tried to show, crosses and mixes
the domains of public and private. Its prime virtue is that of honesty:
The love letter must be a true messenger of affection, love must be
"honest" and honestly expressed."2 In the courts of love, the love
letter is treated in the same manner as the confidante or messenger:
fidelity to the message is a foundational virtue, an absolute ethical
126. See MARTIAL D'AUVERGNE, LES ARRP-TS D'AMOUR 215 (Paris, Picard 1951) (1533).
127. See BOETHIUS, CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY 160 (London, Stock 1897).
128. One of the most common titles under which manuscripts of Capellanus, Tractatus de
amore, circulated was De arte honeste amandi et de reprobatione inhonesti amoris. See ANDREAS
CAPELLANUS ON LovE 12-15 (P.G. Walsh ed., 1982).
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requirement for the reason that such outlaw honesty, such fidelity to
the message, constitutes the space and justice of correspondence. To
eroticize speech, to imbue writing with intimacy, to align the letter
with desire and so also with the power to reach its object, requires a
faith in the existence of a space of transmission. The art of the love
letter was an art of self inscription in a dual sense. First, to write was
to create a self and to overcome a narcissistic melancholy of repose.
Second, the inscription of the self was only possible upon the basis of
the creation of an alternative public space, a jurisdiction or "kind of
Republic" of the soul.129
The lover's discourse literally creates a language and a world, a
theme which is again frequently and directly expressed in the
collections of specimen love letters. The real of love grows out of
correspondence, although in other cultures or periods it could equally
be engendered by gifts, dance, music, icons, or other signs. For the
Latin tradition love springs from the word and each letter to a new
lover begins with the problematic of writing: "I am certain that in
place of a letter I must write you an entire book .. and even then
the fruits of my love would not correspond to the beauty of the things
I propose to you."' 3 ° Love dictates, which means that writing sets up
the space and law of love and it is through writing that the fascination
of the body and the beauty of the soul come to be visible. Even
where writing fails or words run out, it is through the letter that the
lover glimpses or imagines the beloved: "I often find pleasure in your
letters, even though they are very brief, because it seems to me that
they form a perfect book, because where writing is missing I see love
.... ,1 The problem of the Republic of letters is thus that of
establishing and maintaining or keeping open an intangible space,
another public sphere, that of writing and of the justice of its various
erotic correspondences.
Judgment 41 of Martial d'Auvergne's Judgments of Love can
illustrate the point.132 An action was brought jointly by a rejected
lover and the Procurator General of Love-the senior advocate of the
High Court of Love in Paris. It was pleaded that the plaintiff had
spent a great deal of time with the defendant who was his friend and
with whom he frequently shared the secrets of his loves and of the
pleasures and disappointments of his relationships. He would often
recount in private the secret fortunes of his affairs and in doing so he
129. See generally JULIA KRISTEVA, NEW MALADIES OF THE SOUL 3-27 (1995) (discussing
eroticized speech and its rewriting of the soul).
130. Du TRONCHET, supra note 34, at 150.
131. Id. at 94.
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many times touched upon his greatest passion, a love for a woman
whom he was able to see only rarely. The friend would comfort him
and in doing so elicited the name of this woman, the object of this
intense passion. The friend then devised means to meet the woman
himself and used his knowledge of her secrets to gain her favor. He
also used the knowledge gained as the plaintiff's confidant to compose
letters under a false seal purporting to come from the plaintiff. In
these letters her lover complained of her treatment of him and
professed indifference to her and insulted her honour and her person.
"None of these things had the lover ever thought or written. He knew
nothing of these abusive letters, but rather loved the woman and
would have preferred to have been torn to pieces than to have
thought or said anything ill of her." '133 For her part she fainted upon
receiving the first of these letters and subsequently became seriously
ill. When her lover eventually saw her again, she turned her back on
him, "and cursed him, saying she hoped he would burn in hell and
that if she could ever harm him in his goods or person, she would do
SO.'
1 3 4 The friend became the woman's lover and would mock him
when they passed each other in public. The plaintiff, however,
managed with the help of a clerk who had composed the letters at the
instigation of the friend, to obtain the false letters. The bailiffs of the
court of love seized the friend and the Court ordered the letters
burned. The friend was fined, his goods confiscated and he was
ordered to walk up and down outside the woman's house publicly
declaring that he had "evilly and malicously betrayed and deceived his
friend." '135
At one level the decision evidences a love of the text which
matches the lawyer's love. The truth of the love letter is in every
respect as important as the truth of speech or conversation. Indeed in
one sense it is more important in that the use of the letter or of the
confidant introduces in a material or explicit way the distance to
which all language is subject. The principle of fidelity precedes that
of law. Numerous other rules and judgments of love are concerned
precisely with speaking the truth and with speaking well in the sense
of not spreading false reports or otherwise maligning lovers. What is
protected in and circulates with the letter is an image of the lover and
an image of relation. That image is what is lived. That image is the
reality of amour lointain, of love at a distance; it both is and makes
133. Id. at 179. See generally LA COUR AMOUREUSE DITE DE CHARLES VI (Carla Bozzolo
& H hIne Loyau eds., 1982) (explicating the procedures of the High Court of Love and the
statute of 1400 which established them).
134. D'AUVERGNE, supra note 126, at 180.
135. Id. at 181-82.
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the space of relation. 136 The Procurator of Love thus had good
reason to join the cause of the lover defamed by false letters. If there
is to be a law of love then it must protect the poetic space within
which the love affair is lived, the portrait painted, and the word
spoken, read, or sung. To destroy the communication, to falsify the
letter, or to deface the portrait is to collapse the space and possibility
of love, it is sacrilege in the domain of affections. One final example,
drawn from a compilation of cases of love written by a woman, a
pr~cieuse, Marie Catherine Desjardins, in the latter quarter of the
seventeenth century, makes the point most vividly.137
A woman much in love had heard of a portrait painter of excep-
tional skill. Using new techniques, this painter could produce the
finest and most delicate of paintings, portraits "which were so lifelike
that all they lacked was speech.""13 She therefore commissioned the
artist to make a portrait of her, and because a portrait of herself
without her lover would be odious she asked the painter to find a way
of including him as well. The painter represented the woman as the
muse of painting and portrayed her painting a small medallion within
the canvas on which was traced the face of her lover. The picture was
a perfect resemblance and the woman was delighted. The painting was
delivered to the woman while her husband was out of the house and
so she had it put in her closet while she went out on some errands.
While she was out a suitor of hers visited the house. Learning of her
absence he decided to take advantage of it by writing a love letter.
For this purpose he opened the woman's closet and saw the portrait.
He was struck by the beauty of the picture and decided to make use
of it. He moistened his handkerchief and erased the portrait of the
woman's lover and in its place he wrote a love note in verse. After
writing the lines the suitor left. The woman returned and was told of
the suitor's visit. She went to the closet and saw her painting
disfigured and the face of her lover removed. She realizes, in that
moment, intutitively, inexorably, and to her horror that her lover was
thereby destined to die. A short while later he is killed by friends of
the suitor.
The erasure of the image destroyed its object. The theft of the
space of inscription ended the possibility of love. Although the case
is highly metaphorical it vividly portrays the absolute character of the
136. On the tradition of amour lointain, see JEAN-CLAUDE HUCHET, L'AMOUR DIS-
COURTOIS 179-216 (1987). See also JEAN MARKALE, L'AMOUR COURTOIS OU LE COUPLE
INFERNAL 31-87 (1987). These texts and others are discussed in Goodrich, supra note 3, at 659-
62.
137. MARIE CATHERINE DESJARDINS, ANNALES GALANTES DIVISIE EN HUIT PARTIES 133-
92 (Paris, Barbon 1670). Desjardins also published under the name Villedieu.




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1997
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 9: 245
communication of love. The image or correspondence is the relation,
it is the love affair, it is the space of amorous exchange. In Freudian
terms, the imaginary is the basis of identity, and to protect the space
of that identity is the principal purpose of the love letter as law, as
the writ of the court of love. In contemporary terms that imaginary
domain is both a feminine and a feministic political sphere.13 9 In the
immediate context of this analysis the case of the erased portrait
connotes a war of different laws correlated to the antinomy of
different genders. In raising the question of difference and gender the
case allows us to face directly both the political implications of the
other "kind of Republic" and the incommensurable nature of the
different jurisdictions of the arts of law and of love. The justice of
correspondence is concerned with the circulation and the inscription
of images, with a rewriting of the soul. Its law is self-confessedly a
spiritual one and it depends upon the availability of a territory, an
empty space within the public sphere.
V. POSTFACE
There are occasions when it seems appropriate to acknowledge that
an argument is tenuous or its outcome uncertain. To present such an
argument is to admit that it may not convince, that it is not even
necessarily designed to persuade, so much as it simply requires to be
said or to be heard. The tenuous or, in rhetorical terms, probable
argument is incomplete, unfinished, nascent. Such a form of argument,
according to Aristotle, is appropriate to matters of human relationship
and yet, because it is indeterminate and uncertain, it will not yet
instruct us on what to do or where and how to progress.1" Such an
argument does not offer any necessary conclusions but it is also, I will
suggest, a most radical form of intellectual engagement and of critical
exchange. Arguments, traditions, and laws do not always succeed, but
rather tend to burn briefly or fail. Like their authors they die, and like
love letters they may always arrive at an unexpected destination. It is
that uncertainty which makes the tentative argument the most radical
in potential, and it is that species of political possibility that the
history of law's letters and of the prdcieuses can offer.
The domain of relationship is an imaginary space. The project of
incorporating such a space into the public sphere was always likely,
at least initially, to be unsuccessful, and its products to belong to a
negative history of lost social movements. That lack of immediate
139. See generally DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN (1995) (sketching this
argument).
140. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIc 13 (A. Jebb trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1925).
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success is certainly one feature of the politics of the pr6cieuses. In an
era which is not yet over, in which women were at best images and at
worst objects, the proposal of a feminine Republic was both dramatic
and doomed. My argument is that it is precisely that dimension of
failure which makes the social movement and political itinerary of
pr~ciosit6 both challenging and fecund in possibilities. The prcieuses
advocated a new social form and devised a novel system of rule and
of law. They proposed a public domain of relationship governed by
women's courts and a law of amorous correspondence. The explicit
concern of such justice was to institute a space for the difference of
the feminine and to revalue the domain of the image, of the aesthetic
and literary imagination, in such a way as to allow for the develop-
ment of new forms of relationship and lifestyle. The virtue of their
law was its literary character, the power of their jurisdiction was its
imaginary quality, and the truth of their judgments lay in their
fantasmatic appeal. What historiography would judge immediately as
the most negative and ephemeral features of the feminine Republic
can equally be viewed as the guarantees of their survival and eventual
success. The pr~cieuses embarked upon a politics of the image, and it
is that image of letters and of laws that history now re-encounters.
The various wars over the governance of the soul have always been
wars over images. The first concern of law has similarly been that of
a control over the soul which was perceived to be inevitably a matter
of a visual governance or regimen of images. The Church sought to
watch over, to nurse, and to govern the emotional domain or desire
of the subject through a ghostly power that had as its object the
direction of the soul. Secular law inherited that object of governance
and progressively joined the spiritual powers to mundane government
through the jurisdictions of equity and conscience. Again the various
images of sovereignty and subjection, of order and of obedience, of
hierarchy and subordination structured a public sphere around the
images and language of patristic interests and their proprietorial
values. The reality of those interests and the practices of relationship
in which those governed images resulted belonged to the unconscious
of the public sphere. The domain of affection was conceived to be an
invisible, spectral, or imagistic realm. The political project of the
pr~cieuses was in a sense that of making the unconscious conscious
and the soul visible. The means they chose for such an endeavour was
that of supplementing and transgressing the extant discourses of
spiritual value and the institutions of relationship upon which they
depended. They offered a dangerous supplement by means of creating
a space for the image, for love and its various correspondences, within
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the object of the feminine public sphere, it was both its goal and its
means of transgression.
From the very beginning the argument of the pr~cieuses had been
political and had been concerned with the creation of a public space
within which women could write themselves and so establish a
separate domain of value or pr6ciosit9. The means of this politics was
linguistic or discursive in that the purpose of the feminine public
sphere was to establish an alternative conception of value and of
relationship within and between the sexes. The concern with language
was a concern with the deep structures of social interaction, of genre
and law. For the precieuses writing was a political act as well as an
intimate and erotic activity. To write, to create the space of cor-
respondence and the possibility of a justice for intimacy, was to
reclaim a hugely significant dimension of the public sphere, to lay
claim to an alternative symbolic and institutional space.
Without burdening the analysis with too great a degree of detail, it
can and has been argued that the politics of the prcieuses was not
only a literary politics but that it grew out of the need to understand
and regulate, to think through, the rules of communication between
lovers. That problem of relationship addressed by the pr~cieuses was
one of ethics and of language, of law and of love letters, of style and
of judgment. To read those love letters, to recoup that history, not as
reality but as fantasm, not as truth but as a possibility, opens up an
ethical-political space-perhaps a space of the feminine-within the
public sphere. The love letter is its own law and if it is still not clear
what that law is, that is in part a reflection of our fear of difference
and in part a tribute to a space and aesthetic, a judgment or law, that
has yet to be fully inscribed. The philosopher Agamben has argued in
a work on the Idea of Prose that "justice is the handing on of the
Forgotten .... [It is not] the transmission of memory [but] the
transmission of oblivion."' 1 What I take that to mean is that it is
neither possible nor desirable to recover or pass on the substance of
history or the plenitude of lost love letters. What is forgotten
constitutes an empty space, an oblivion or unconscious, and it is just
to pass on, to transmit, that space of unconsciousness. That space or
forgotten domain is one of ethics and not of rules, of love and of
love's law. One could say that it is the unconscious, it is the possibility
of justice. By that I mean that the forgotten, the blank space or empty
envelope, institutes the possibility of subjective transformation. To
pass on the space of the forgotten is to imagine another public sphere,
a kind of Republic, an empty tableau in which the subject, feminine
141. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, IDEA OF PROSE 79 (1995).
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or masculine, has the space within which to come to terms with their
unconscious, to write themselves. Such would be the law of the
Republic of letters, and such would be epistolary justice.
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